Colossus

Title: Colossus – The Rise and Fall of the American Empire

Author: Niall Ferguson

Publisher: Penguin, 2005 (First published 2004)

ISBN: 978-0-14-101700-6

Pages: 302

Another book which is written as a sequel to Ferguson’s work, Empire, that described about the rise and fall of the British Empire. In his illuminating style, Niall Ferguson lays threadbare the events that established the primacy of American influence on the world stage and how a shadow of doubt regarding its capability descended on it after its debacle in the Vietnam War. A curious thing the author notes regarding American sentiments about acquiring or controlling territories overseas is the permanent state of denial. Having won its freedom after an armed struggle against an imperial power, the United States naturally want not to don the mantle of another imperial entity. Even though the book is not such a page turner as Empire, the author makes it more than lively by incisive reasoning and carefully tabulated data to support the argument. An extensive section on Notes and Bibliography serve as credentials to Ferguson’s painstaking research in creating this masterly volume. A set of plates is what the author has missed in this tome, but the verbal imagery is thoroughly enlightening. An introduction to the author is not presented here, as Ferguson is a favourite author of mine and many of his books have already been reviewed earlier in this blog.

The book opens with a thorough analysis of how the US expanded its home territory after its independence from the greatest imperial power of all time – Britain. Early Americans paid cash to acquire territory instead of fighting for them as the continent was still empty, save for the indigenous Indians. But the natives never seriously entered the strategical estimates of the white colonists. Thus, Louisiana was purchased from France, Texas from Spain, Alaska from Russia and several other places that constitute states now. These acquisitions may also be liked to colonial possessions, but nobody accounted it so. America was always an Empire in denial as any acts that imitated the colonial powers were thought to run counter to the fundamental principles on which the nation took birth. The 19^th century saw more theatres, like Philippines, where this hide and seek drama enacted. The reason cited often for intervening military in a foreign land was to ensure freedom of choice of the government for its people and to establish democratic institutions modeled on American originals. The noteworthy fact was that the colonies were soon integrated in the economic structure of the mother country, from which the colony could not detach itself at a later date. Freedom from American control often connoted unacceptable financial bottlenecks, and it succeeded in cohesion among most of the territories the US acquired in 19^th century. Many of them would have been promoted as states, in ancient Roman fashion, but were thwarted by vested interests at home. If a farming territory, became a de jure state, its cheap farm produce were sure to overwhelm the home markets since tariff burdens will not be applicable to them. This made Americans to deny statehood to many territories they acquired.

The first half of the last century saw America establish itself as an undeniable super power. It entered the two world wars rather late, maintaining neutrality in the conflicts raging in the old world. But when it stepped in, or rather forced to step in, the intervention was a decisive turning point in the war. Germany, which led America’s enemies in both wars, was no match for the devastating power of America’s economy and weaponry. But Ferguson points out a crucial difference between it and Britain at this stage. The British were exhausted at the end of two great wars, unable to hold on to its colonies sprawled worldwide. Instead of stepping into the shoes of their former masters, US insisted on granting freedom to British colonies after the war. No amount of dillydallying by Britain got purchase. The new superpower was determined to attach this criterion on a pre-condition to post-War aid. Consequently, British colonies gained independence one by one. But the economic and social plights of the newly freed countries were not enviable. Most of them plunged into dictatorships, civil wars, corruption and decline in every parameter of progress. The author lists a slew of reasons to explain why this happened, but they look like tailor made to suit the arguments for imperialism.

The Second World War was quickly followed by the Cold war, where the US acted upon a policy of containment of communist forces, often intervening militarily. The most disastrous case was Vietnam where they hoped for a limited involvement, most of the fighting to be done by nationalist forces. But the fierce challenge from North Vietnam forced America to involve more and more in the war that turned nastier by the day. As thousands of soldiers fell in the field, public opinion turned against the involvement. Finally, America withdrew ignominiously. Ferguson states that this fiasco overshadowed all future American interventions that aimed at only a short-term engagement at the end of which power was to be handed back to the locals. A contrasting observation between the American talented young men and those of Imperial UK is made here. The promising graduates from the Ivy League have no ambitions to serve anywhere other than their homeland. In fact, very few Americans serve willingly in the Third World. Even though the author does not spell it out in so many words, we may deduce that generations of Americans brought up with utmost comfort unmatched anywhere in the world are not willing to sacrifice it on the call of duty. As compared to this, there was a gulf of difference with the British a hundred years before. Then, young men with high caliber aspired to join the colonial civil service and worked hard to pass the test to join the meritocracy.

Ferguson contemplates on the possibility of another state acting as a counterweight – not rival – to the US in the near future. Though the European Union and China fits the bill superficially, structural problems abound, which prevent them acting as a hegemony, as the Soviets once did. So, if America does not want to be involved for a long term in the countries it invaded – Iraq and Afghanistan – the world may be seeing a lot of apolarity than unipolarity, In fact, he puts forward compelling arguments for the US to stay a long time to make democracy and effective institutions of trade are established.

The author genuinely feels that the Empire was a good thing for the native peoples of Asia and Africa. This was made amply clear from his previous book, ‘Empire’ reviewed earlier in this blog. But his eulogies exceed allowable limits in some of the remarks he make in this book. We know that whatever may be the political, economic and infrastructural benefits the British Empire conferred on India, there is no counter-argument to the fact that the life and welfare of the Black masses were of no concern to the colonial task masters. Famines were a regular feature in India that occurred regularly, killed thousands of poor people, with the administration standing as a mute spectator. And Ferguson goes onto justify that too as he says, “the famines that beset Indian economy were far more environmental than political in origin and after 1900, the problem was in fact alleviated by the greater integration of the Indian market for food stuffs. The Bengal famine of 1943 arose precisely because improvements introduced under British rule collapsed under the strain of war” (p.195). How convenient is the legitimization! Perhaps the author would care to explain why independent India never saw a famine again, even with its corrupt and inefficient administration?

Even thought the book’s subtitle denotes ‘the rise and fall of the American Empire’, Ferguson had not been successful in illustrating how the fall of the Empire came as yet. In a few decades, maybe, but no one is sure of that.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 3 Star