Title: The Malabar Rebellion
Author: Gangadharan M
Publisher: DC Books, 2008 (First)
ISBN: 9788126418633
Pages: 295
The Malabar Rebellion, also called the Mappila riots, is a major conflagration in South India that began as a insurrection against British rule, but later degraded as a communal riot. Even today, discussions on the riot are sure to awake passions and conflicting versions of opinion in Kerala. The riots also provide an abject lesson for politicians who ride the communal tiger to achieve short term goals. The Congress roped in fanatics in the name of Khilafat, but later lost all control of them. The fanatics had no plans to follow the path of non-violence, other than to establish a Khilafat kingdom. It is worthwhile now to examine the close similarities in the modes of punishment the Khilafatists meted out to dissidents and sinners – according to their narrow definition – with that of the Islamic State in Iraq, which we witnessed in recent months. Both involved beheadings, extortion of protection money from non-Muslims and death for indulging in prostitution. The book provides day to day exposition of events from its inception to its eventual suppression. The book also brings to light the utterly selfish trait of the rebel leaders to save their skins by offering themselves as prisoners to the Government troops when the tide turned. Even though they exhorted their ranks to fight till death, which thousands did and died as a result, the leaders – Ali Musaliar of Tirurangadi, Variankunnath Kunhamed Haji and Chembrasseri Tangal – meekly surrendered to the British, who summarily courtmartialled and shot them! M Gangadharan was a professor of history, associated with editing and publishing of magazines of art and ideas. He has published a number of works in Malayalam on literary, social and political criticism.
The book unveils a neat picture of the events that led to the violent outbreak of riots. The Mappilas, who controlled the maritime trade with West Asia, found their profession being usurped by the Portuguese. The Mappilas were violent in preserving their monopoly, but the Portuguese doubly so, in wresting it from them. Finally, the Europeans had their way and Indian foreign trade flowed through their hands alone. By the 18th century, when Portuguese power finally ebbed, the Mappilas found to their dismay that time was not on their side. Bombay had assumed the pole position in foreign trade by that point. Islam is a religion as well as a political philosophy. When Mysore invaded Malabar under Hyder Ali (1766), the Mappilas tasted the intoxicating sweetness of political power for the first time. When Tipu Sultan was defeated (1792), and the country was subjugated by the British, they resented the change of masters in a vehement show of discontent. The British had a tough time collecting revenue from the province. There were a slew of violent outbreaks throughout the 19th century. Matters were further worsened by the agrarian situation obtained at that time in Malabar. Most of the land belonged to Jenmis of the Nambudiri caste. There were intermediaries called kanamdars and then the tenants, kudiyans, who bore the full brunt of the demands of the upper castes. Mappilas were tenants mostly, and they opposed the exploitation by channeling the rage through religious lines.
The aftermath of the First World War witnessed tumultuous events in India’s political scene of action. Protests against Rowlatt Act, which curtailed freedom of expression, put the British on the defensive. The massacre at Jalianwala Bagh occurred when the government tried to crush the protests by force. Crawling orders were promulgated there, and natives were forced to crawl on all fours in a street where a British woman was assaulted the previous day. The whole of India seethed in anger as a result. Curiously, or rather shockingly, Indian Muslims’ cause of anger was not this issue on their own door steps, but rather against the British action against the Sultan of Turkey, who was also the self-styled caliph. He was the temporal leader of the faithful, and the Allies’ curtailment of his imperial position was construed as an act against Islam. The Congress party under Gandhiji found this to be a golden opportunity to turn the Muslims against the British. Though Jalianwala Bagh didn’t make any impression on them, Khilafat did. Even though the people of Turkey itself was fed up with the sultan, who was soon deposed in a military coup, Indian Muslims wanted him back in power which he had lost as a result of the disastrous performance of the Turkish forces in the world war. That the Muslims were turned on by Khilafat, and not national consciousness, was exposed when the leader Shoukat Ali made a speech at a Congress conference at Erode, Tamil Nadu. He told the audience that for every one rupee a Hindu donates to the Congress, 12 annas (75%) go to the Congress and 4 annas (25%) to Khilafat, while the rupee donated by a Muslim will be divided in the ratio of 12 annas to Khilafat and 4 annas to the Congress.
Courting communalism to win short term goals is like playing with fire, and the Congress learnt this lesson with a rebellion that sprang out in Malabar in August 1921. Ali Musaliar of Tirurangadi challenged the British authority and set up a parallel administration. Government’s blotched and insensitive attempts to rein in the rebels made the situation rather worse. The rioters wanted to establish an Islamic state, Mappilastan, and forced many Hindus to convert to Islam. Loot and forced collection of money and grains made Hindus flee the riot hit areas. Nobody was allowed to travel freely in South Malabar, without a ‘passport’ issued by Variankunnath Kunhamed Haji, a rebel leader. K Madhavan Nair, who was the President of the state Congress party and de jure of the Khilafat agitation itself, remarked that “Not only Mappilas who were ordinarily of bad character, but Mappilas considered decent till then also joined the looters or helped them, or shared the loot. In most places, the prominent among the Mappilas did not try sincerely to stop the loot” (p.178).
The rebellion was brutal and inhuman. Hundreds of Hindus were killed, raped and looted and thousands more were forcibly converted to Islam. Naturally, the military action was also equally brutal and inhuman. The troops killed at their sweet will and burnt the houses of Mapplias indiscriminately, without regard to whether they were rebels or not. In Melmuri amsam alone, 246 persons were killed in action. This sent a chill down the spines of the rebels who were soon found looking for a face saving strategy for surrender. Government offered liberal terms to those who offered to lay down their arms, which were not often implemented. The Wagon Tragedy, in which 70 people (67 Muslims and 3 Hindus) were killed, was another horrible incident.
Analysts who look into the reasons why Islamic terrorism find willing recruits anywhere in the world fail to point their fingers to fanaticism as the root cause. They come up with umpteen reasons like poverty, unemployment, political repression, corrupt administration and what not! But never once do they identify the real motive behind the birth of suicide bombers – religious fanaticism. Political correctness might be a compelling factor in suppressing the truth as the scholars don’t want to alienate powerful elements in the society, who professes to condemn terrorist attacks after the event, but takes no effort to prevent such outbreaks. There was a welcome change in the governmental panels set up to look into religious violence reported from Malabar. The Special Commission in 1952 reported that the violence was “due to the most decided fanaticism of the Mappilas” (p.26). And then, “the Hindus in the parts where outbreaks are most frequent, stand in such fear of the Mappilas as mostly not to dare to press for their rights against them” (p.26). Winterbotham, who was a member of the Revenue Board who inquired about the outbreaks in 1896 found poverty and discontent of tenants as one of the causes of the riot, but found it difficult to explain why “many scores of lads” and even a “few in comfortable circumstances have been tempted to throw away their lives” (p.30). The poverty hypothesis is rubbished by this shrewd observation. He further reports that “no words can depict the abject terror of the Hindus of all ranks and classes, while a gang of Mapplia fanatics is on the war path” (p.30). As William Logan remarks in his Malabar Manual (1887), “the exhibition of Mappila fanaticism is used as a means towards an end…the land is passing slowly but surely into the possession of the Mappilas and the Hindus are going to the wall” (p.31). Exhortations to evict the land of Kafirs (infidels) echoed throughout South Malabar. All these points suffice to prove the point that the Mapplias wanted to make Malabar an Islamic state on the lines of what we see in Iraq and Syria these days. Violent uprisings were frequent in Malabar, such as those in the years 1836, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1858, 1860, 1864, 1865, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1880, 1894, 1896, 1915 and 1919. The stage was being set for the final showdown of 1921-22. People who portray the rebellion as part of India’s freedom struggle may read this again.
This book presents an objective view of the incidents in Malabar through official narratives. Even though one may accuse the government of using propaganda to support the official version, reports of district authorities to the provincial administration in Madras is free of hyperbole and stated the bare facts as they unfurled. Gangadharan intervenes wherever required, with clarifications which give the reader directions to the places and persons to look for. Analysis of the composition of the rioters, its causes and character, the role of the officials, the rationale of the spread and sustenance, the impacts and its consequences are painstakingly laid bare. The book includes a few maps showing the areas of unrest and also an index for easily locating the topics. The impressive bibliography provides many outlets for inquisitive spirits who want to proceed further from where the author had stopped.
The book unveils a neat picture of the events that led to the violent outbreak of riots. The Mappilas, who controlled the maritime trade with West Asia, found their profession being usurped by the Portuguese. The Mappilas were violent in preserving their monopoly, but the Portuguese doubly so, in wresting it from them. Finally, the Europeans had their way and Indian foreign trade flowed through their hands alone. By the 18th century, when Portuguese power finally ebbed, the Mappilas found to their dismay that time was not on their side. Bombay had assumed the pole position in foreign trade by that point. Islam is a religion as well as a political philosophy. When Mysore invaded Malabar under Hyder Ali (1766), the Mappilas tasted the intoxicating sweetness of political power for the first time. When Tipu Sultan was defeated (1792), and the country was subjugated by the British, they resented the change of masters in a vehement show of discontent. The British had a tough time collecting revenue from the province. There were a slew of violent outbreaks throughout the 19th century. Matters were further worsened by the agrarian situation obtained at that time in Malabar. Most of the land belonged to Jenmis of the Nambudiri caste. There were intermediaries called kanamdars and then the tenants, kudiyans, who bore the full brunt of the demands of the upper castes. Mappilas were tenants mostly, and they opposed the exploitation by channeling the rage through religious lines.
The aftermath of the First World War witnessed tumultuous events in India’s political scene of action. Protests against Rowlatt Act, which curtailed freedom of expression, put the British on the defensive. The massacre at Jalianwala Bagh occurred when the government tried to crush the protests by force. Crawling orders were promulgated there, and natives were forced to crawl on all fours in a street where a British woman was assaulted the previous day. The whole of India seethed in anger as a result. Curiously, or rather shockingly, Indian Muslims’ cause of anger was not this issue on their own door steps, but rather against the British action against the Sultan of Turkey, who was also the self-styled caliph. He was the temporal leader of the faithful, and the Allies’ curtailment of his imperial position was construed as an act against Islam. The Congress party under Gandhiji found this to be a golden opportunity to turn the Muslims against the British. Though Jalianwala Bagh didn’t make any impression on them, Khilafat did. Even though the people of Turkey itself was fed up with the sultan, who was soon deposed in a military coup, Indian Muslims wanted him back in power which he had lost as a result of the disastrous performance of the Turkish forces in the world war. That the Muslims were turned on by Khilafat, and not national consciousness, was exposed when the leader Shoukat Ali made a speech at a Congress conference at Erode, Tamil Nadu. He told the audience that for every one rupee a Hindu donates to the Congress, 12 annas (75%) go to the Congress and 4 annas (25%) to Khilafat, while the rupee donated by a Muslim will be divided in the ratio of 12 annas to Khilafat and 4 annas to the Congress.
Courting communalism to win short term goals is like playing with fire, and the Congress learnt this lesson with a rebellion that sprang out in Malabar in August 1921. Ali Musaliar of Tirurangadi challenged the British authority and set up a parallel administration. Government’s blotched and insensitive attempts to rein in the rebels made the situation rather worse. The rioters wanted to establish an Islamic state, Mappilastan, and forced many Hindus to convert to Islam. Loot and forced collection of money and grains made Hindus flee the riot hit areas. Nobody was allowed to travel freely in South Malabar, without a ‘passport’ issued by Variankunnath Kunhamed Haji, a rebel leader. K Madhavan Nair, who was the President of the state Congress party and de jure of the Khilafat agitation itself, remarked that “Not only Mappilas who were ordinarily of bad character, but Mappilas considered decent till then also joined the looters or helped them, or shared the loot. In most places, the prominent among the Mappilas did not try sincerely to stop the loot” (p.178).
The rebellion was brutal and inhuman. Hundreds of Hindus were killed, raped and looted and thousands more were forcibly converted to Islam. Naturally, the military action was also equally brutal and inhuman. The troops killed at their sweet will and burnt the houses of Mapplias indiscriminately, without regard to whether they were rebels or not. In Melmuri amsam alone, 246 persons were killed in action. This sent a chill down the spines of the rebels who were soon found looking for a face saving strategy for surrender. Government offered liberal terms to those who offered to lay down their arms, which were not often implemented. The Wagon Tragedy, in which 70 people (67 Muslims and 3 Hindus) were killed, was another horrible incident.
Analysts who look into the reasons why Islamic terrorism find willing recruits anywhere in the world fail to point their fingers to fanaticism as the root cause. They come up with umpteen reasons like poverty, unemployment, political repression, corrupt administration and what not! But never once do they identify the real motive behind the birth of suicide bombers – religious fanaticism. Political correctness might be a compelling factor in suppressing the truth as the scholars don’t want to alienate powerful elements in the society, who professes to condemn terrorist attacks after the event, but takes no effort to prevent such outbreaks. There was a welcome change in the governmental panels set up to look into religious violence reported from Malabar. The Special Commission in 1952 reported that the violence was “due to the most decided fanaticism of the Mappilas” (p.26). And then, “the Hindus in the parts where outbreaks are most frequent, stand in such fear of the Mappilas as mostly not to dare to press for their rights against them” (p.26). Winterbotham, who was a member of the Revenue Board who inquired about the outbreaks in 1896 found poverty and discontent of tenants as one of the causes of the riot, but found it difficult to explain why “many scores of lads” and even a “few in comfortable circumstances have been tempted to throw away their lives” (p.30). The poverty hypothesis is rubbished by this shrewd observation. He further reports that “no words can depict the abject terror of the Hindus of all ranks and classes, while a gang of Mapplia fanatics is on the war path” (p.30). As William Logan remarks in his Malabar Manual (1887), “the exhibition of Mappila fanaticism is used as a means towards an end…the land is passing slowly but surely into the possession of the Mappilas and the Hindus are going to the wall” (p.31). Exhortations to evict the land of Kafirs (infidels) echoed throughout South Malabar. All these points suffice to prove the point that the Mapplias wanted to make Malabar an Islamic state on the lines of what we see in Iraq and Syria these days. Violent uprisings were frequent in Malabar, such as those in the years 1836, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1858, 1860, 1864, 1865, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1880, 1894, 1896, 1915 and 1919. The stage was being set for the final showdown of 1921-22. People who portray the rebellion as part of India’s freedom struggle may read this again.
This book presents an objective view of the incidents in Malabar through official narratives. Even though one may accuse the government of using propaganda to support the official version, reports of district authorities to the provincial administration in Madras is free of hyperbole and stated the bare facts as they unfurled. Gangadharan intervenes wherever required, with clarifications which give the reader directions to the places and persons to look for. Analysis of the composition of the rioters, its causes and character, the role of the officials, the rationale of the spread and sustenance, the impacts and its consequences are painstakingly laid bare. The book includes a few maps showing the areas of unrest and also an index for easily locating the topics. The impressive bibliography provides many outlets for inquisitive spirits who want to proceed further from where the author had stopped.
The book is highly recommended.
Rating: 3 Star
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