The Indus Saga

Title: The Indus Saga – From Pataliputra to Partition

Author: Aitzaz Ahsan

Publisher: Roli Books, 2010 (First published 1996)

ISBN: 9788174364210

Pages: 467

India and Pakistan are sworn enemies. There is more than a passing chance that these two nuclear capable countries may start a war with disastrous consequences for both. Indeed, there is no love lost between the two nations; they were arch enemies right from the start when Pakistan broke out of India in 1947. Being an Indian, I can vouch for the degree of suspicion and enmity we harbour against Pakistan and I expect Pakistanis to share this mistrust towards us. This book suggests that Pakistan nurses a bunker-mentality, always wary of aggression and on the defensive, and a fragility syndrome when one is apprehensive that another country may annex them forcefully. This feeling of insecurity stems from anxiety about the logic behind the birth of Pakistan. A sovereign state for Muslims is a weak argument in the face of enlightenment that is visiting more and more parts of the globe. This book provides a solid basis for the birth and continued existence of Pakistan. ‘The Indus Saga’ is the answer to the question ‘Why Pakistan?’ This post-partition justification of the country also laments the unbridled growth of fundamentalism, which is not what Jinnah wanted for his dream republic. Aitzaz Ahsan is a member of the Pakistan People’s Party and belongs to a family with the tradition social work spanning three generations. He was elected to the federal legislative assembly and served as a minister. He is a lawyer with a solid British education at his back. He was incarcerated under arbitrary detention laws, during one such tenure he wrote this book.

The book is based on the surmise that the Indus River, its tributaries and the area surrounding it, formed a distinct, historical, political, cultural and ethnic entity. Since this territory is exactly what is inside the geographical boundary of Pakistan (West Pakistan, if you reckon the 1947 boundary). The subcontinent has its two large river systems – Indus and Ganga. Indus was always separated from India. Its cultural heritage was so distinct that both Shankara and Vivekananda, the two great Hindu integrators, couldn’t create a synthesis of the two regions. Ahsan claims that of the last 6000 years of Indus history, for nearly 5500 years it led a separate life from the Indian mainstream. Only three universal states, the Mauryan, Mughal and the British could integrate them with a unity of command which lasted hardly five centuries. But this argument is a flimsy one. Many local regions in South India were never held under any of the three universal states, but those are now happy members of the Indian Union. The author then puts forward the bold assertion that racially, ethnically, linguistically and culturally, the people of Pakistan are more closely linked to the people of Central Asia and Iran than Indians. It also rubbishes the claims of many in Pakistan’s ruling elite that they descended from the Arabs – the fountain springs of Islam. He takes great pains to explain the ethnic and societal differences existing between the societies of Arabia and Pakistan, but wryly accepts that often, perceptions become more crucial than the facts, even when a perception has been fabricated deliberately by the ruling elite.

The book is structured in a way as to vindicate the author’s ideas on the issues plaguing modern Pakistan. The priestly aristocracy in Mohenjo Daro was steeped in superstition and rituals. Sloth and stagnation ensued from this atrophy that finally led to the civilization’s downfall. Ahsan points a warning finger at Pakistani society that unless they reject the fundamentalists among them, a similar fate is on the cards. The book inevitably includes many references to ancient Indian history as well, which are based on the works of Kosambi and Romila Thapar. Rafiq Zakaria is relied on for the medieval period. There are many faulty notions expressed in the text on Vedic class structure, terming the Shudras as synonymous with Pariahs and that tantrism coexisted with Buddha. The Indus civilization was crucially dependent on bronze. With the spread of iron, state power migrated to the sources of its ore, in Bihar. The first major empire was founded in Pataliputra under the Mauryas. Alexander’s invasion is projected as the first among a series of foreign raids in which the military prowess of the Indus shielded the rest of the country. He also doubts whether Porus had indeed defeated Alexander, judging by the swift withdrawal of the emperor through a riverine route. The first part of the book logically ends with the Arab conquest of Sindh in 711 CE by Mohammed bin Qasim. However, Ahsan takes a wide detour of the Islamic rule with his remark that brahminism, rise of castes, and village isolation are the reasons of the country’s defeat against European imperialism (p.95). This fast forwarding of the Gupta period towards the British ignores the corroding weaknesses the country had inherited under a millennium of Muslim rule.

Pakistan now reels under the iron grip of Islamic fundamentalism. But this present reality has not hindered many Pakistanis from extolling the virtues of bigoted Muslim kings of the Sultanates of Delhi and Mughal Empire, especially Aurangzeb and Babur. However, this book breaks with this tradition and pictures Babur’s attack as a time of extreme hardship to the Muslims of Indus as well. Babur spared only those Pathans who came to plead before him with a clutch of grass between their teeth and surrendering before him as Babur’s cows (p.150). Strife frequently arose between the Indus cultivator and Delhi kings. Hereditary land rights were assigned for zamindars, who were heavily penalized. Things reached such a pass that the term chaghtay in Punjab came to be denoted for robber barons and cruel administrators. It may be remembered here that Mughals claimed descent from Chaghtay Turks! Indus also produced rebels like Abdullah, who led peasant riots in Punjab against the Mughals. Ahsan generalizes the profligate spending in present day Pakistan as originating from the social mindset generated by frequent raids and plunder of the region, epitomized by the expropriation by Taimur, Babur, Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Abdali. The prevailing anarchy that lasted many centuries forced people to spend as much as they can, obviating the logic to save. The idiomatic refrain in Punjab, which goes like “Only that which you eat is yours, The rest will be appropriated by Ahmed Shah” says it all. This is said to be the root cause of consumerism and ostentation in modern Pakistan. The author makes known the contrast between Indian and Pakistani politicians where the former are noted for the simplicity in attire and lifestyle. Those centuries of anarchy increased the tolerance threshold of the elite to cruel rulers. Governors could freely switch loyalty without stigma to the winning party. The only precondition was to fight bravely till submission. The Bengalis didn’t share this trait of meek acquiescence to authority and the author counts this as one of the reasons why East Pakistan parted ways with Pakistan in 1971. The Sufi orders of the Indus – mainly Chishti, Suhrawardy, Qadri and Naqshbandi – preached the message of goodwill and tolerance among the religions.

Even though the Indian and the Indus mindset was bogged down by centuries of mutually injurious interactions, that which precipitated the partition of the country was the transformation of economy under the British. The Hindu middle class adjusted themselves to the foreign power, just as they did with the Muslim invaders earlier, and became tightly integrated with the administration of the country. The Muslims couldn’t do it sooner than Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, since the elite had not fully come to terms with loss of power to an infidel nation. This caused strife among Hindus and Muslims, which was convenient for the British. A joining of forces took place in the 1857 war of independence, by Awadhi and Bengali sepoys. The Punjabi and Sindhi soldiers who kept their loyalty to their white masters wanted to take revenge against the mutineers who had earlier annexed their homelands. Ahsan claims this to be the first victory of Indus against India. The flashpoint was reached when Congress couldn’t accommodate the Muslim League in its ministries formed in 1937. After this humiliating defeat and during the Second World War, Jinnah assured himself the support of the Muslim landed aristocracy and staked claim for a separate homeland for the Muslims. This was granted eventually, but the author insists that what Jinnah had in mind was nothing like what Pakistan had turned out to be.

This is a great effort to provide a logical necessity of the birth of Pakistan. Very few politicians in the world have such caliber to conjure a fully grown rationale out of thin air. Readers have the right to disagree with the author and many omissions can be pointed out on the argument, but still, Ahsan’s strenuous effort to justify the existence of his nation on valid grounds other than religious, is commendable. His style is very endearing and compact. Even with this broad brush, the logic of East Pakistan is missed out. But it won’t cause a problem now; as that part went on to become another nation in 1971. In order to make up for parts of history that are still missing, Ahsan deploys legends as history, particularly the folk tales of Raja Rasalu and Puran. There might be some truth in the legend, but a folk hero who had spent twelve years in a well hidden from the society is hardly history. Similar is the extravagant claim that the Indus region had a republican tradition with elected monarchy. Ahsan’s demarcation of the region west of the Gurdaspur – Kathiawar salient as the Indus region makes it an outpost of India, but the author always treats it as an outpost of Central Asia. Whatever it may be, the region was never autonomous. Either Delhi or Kabul exercised hegemony over it till 1947, when Pakistan was born.

Before I stop, let me express a word of reassurance to any Pakistani who may be reading these lines. We Indians do not want to annex you to our country under the pretext of Akhand Bharat. Those who raise such a cry are motivated more to whip up nationalism than any real desire to put their words into practice. The reason for this reluctance is not hard to see, that we absolutely don’t want 338 million Muslims of Pakistan and Bangladesh to enter our electoral rolls!

The book is gifted with a neat Index and good bibliography. A few photographic plates would’ve added much interest.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 3 Star