Sunday, March 22, 2020

Nehru – A Troubled Legacy



Title: Nehru – A Troubled Legacy
Author: RNP Singh
Publisher: Wisdom Tree, 2015 (First)
ISBN: 9788183284424
Pages: 335

Mahatma Gandhi led the Indian struggle for freedom from the British yoke. The nation stood solidly behind him. Thousands sacrificed all that they had – their wealth, career and personal life – to heed Gandhi’s call for national action against the occupying foreigner. As time progressed, it became evident to shrewd political observers that Britain would eventually relinquish power. It was more a question of when than if. The Congress party suddenly became a stepping stone to power and riches. Motilal Nehru was a super-rich lawyer in Allahabad who had scant regard for the Satyagraha mode of nonviolent protest. However, sensing a good opportunity for his family, he joined Congress and persuaded Gandhi to make Jawaharlal Nehru, his son with a failed legal career, the Congress president in 1929. Motilal was the incumbent president of the party and his dynastic ambitions were clearly visible to all in his attempt to hand over the position to his son. This catapulted Jawaharlal into a high-profile career. But the ordinary party workers were not with him due to his elitist life style and company. The crucial moment came about in 1946. By influencing Gandhi once again, he wiggled himself into the party president’s chair once more, and assumed prime ministership once the country became independent. Most of the Congress stalwarts were much older than Nehru and in the first decade of freedom, all of them passed away, leaving the stage open for Nehru and his dynasty. They took control of the Congress party which is still laboring under the family’s thumb. This book is a logical assessment of Nehru’s performance and assigns his failure to his greed for autocratic hold on both the government and the party, his own ideas of implementation of socialism, lack of understanding and appreciation of the poor man’s requirements and of rural India. RNP Singh is a noted political writer who had served earlier in the Intelligence Bureau. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, a think tank, in New Delhi.

Singh provides a saddening narrative on how Nehru turned the Congress party into his personal fief. This should be an eye-opener for the naïve who are still taken in by the party and old Congress governments’ propaganda that Nehru laid the foundation stone of democracy. This book tells how Nehru emasculated a series of party presidents to ensure his unopposed dominance in the party machine. When Nehru became prime minister, J B Kripalani was the Congress president and he resigned in November 1947, frustrated at Nehru not consulting or even informing him about important government policy decisions. Nehru brought in Pattabhi Sitaramayya next, who did not assert or even ask for equality and confined the functions of the party president only to organizational matters. P D Tandon came next in 1950 with Patel’s support, but Patel died soon in December 1950. In the beginning, Tandon tried to function independently and did not pay enough regard to Nehru’s concerns in party affairs. But Nehru intervened wherever possible and threatened to withdraw from the Working Committee if it was not reconstituted to suit his taste. Tandon resigned in disgust in 1951 upon which Nehru himself assumed the party’s presidency. Three years later, he nominated his loyal crony U N Dhebar for the post who kept the chair warm for his daughter Indira to become president in 1959. He filled important positions with the second generation of Congressmen who were not distinguished enough to question him. The new line of Congress presidents readily accepted their subordinate position. At the same time, he was determined that none of the state chief ministers emulate his modus operandi and become powerful. He wanted to deny them the opportunity to build themselves up into powerful potentates who could challenge Nehru. Congress passed a resolution forbidding state chief ministers from holding office in the state Congress committees. Sanjiva Reddy, the Congress president from 1960 to 1963, publicly remarked that as the party president, he was treated as ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s chaprasi (office boy)’ (p.24). Singh claims that what Nehru was after was not personal supremacy, but dynastic dominance.

The book exhibits some of Nehru's personality traits, most notably hypocrisy. While deftly pulling the strings for Indira’s elevation, he expressed ‘surprise’ in a noting on his diary at the idea of her becoming the party leader as if he was totally alien to such a scenario. Whom was he trying to hoodwink? Noted historian K M Munshi puts it down succinctly. He remarked that ‘Nehru was justifiably proud of his heroic role in the struggle for freedom, pampered by his doting father, built up as his heir by Gandhi, spoiled by interested adulation, was intolerant to criticism and impatient of opposition’ (p.68). Nehru tolerated dissent only so long as it remained defused and articulated within the orbit of the Congress system. His democratic credentials are further slurred by the frequent dismissal of state governments on a whim. Between 1952 and 1964, he imposed President’s Rule five times to dislodge non-Congress chief ministers. Tired of his unwarranted intrusion in their departments, S P Mukherjee, K C Neogi, Ambedkar and John Mathai resigned from Nehru's cabinet.

Nehru's megalomania is fully exposed in this book. Nehru was a hero not only in the eyes of the people, but also in his own eyes. He believed that he was a man of destiny and that he had been cast for a historic role. Later in life, he developed a habit of making his own decisions on vital national and international issues and then presenting them as fait accompli to his cabinet and the parliamentary committees. Transfer of the enclave of Berubari to Pakistan was taken without consulting the West Bengal state which housed this patch of territory. Minority appeasement was begun by Nehru in national politics. Akalis were brought in as a group in Congress for the 1957 election. The Bishop of Kottayam issued an appeal to the Christians of Kerala which projected Nehru's image as the only leader who was a protector of minorities. He openly enticed the Muslim vote bank and made a political alliance with the Muslim league in Kerala.

The author presents enough evidence to prove his claim that Nehru kick started corruption in high places while keeping himself out of the cesspool. He exhibited an ostrich-like attitude to corruption, refusing to get convinced even when all the incriminating evidence lay before him. He believed that corruption is a result of the democratic process. His own private secretary, M O Mathai, was found to be corrupt, but Nehru defended him. He harboured politicians in administration on the plea that they are otherwise efficient! Congress badly needed the money as its sessions and other programs had become shows requiring extravagant expenditure. All this pomp and show required huge amounts of money. Raising election propaganda costs was another guzzler. When the pressure became irritatingly persistent, Nehru ordered commissions of enquiry but sat firmly upon their reports. These commissions were usually headed by serving judges of the judiciary and found many politicians guilty. However, no criminal charges were brought upon them. Nehru was satisfied by their resignations and they enjoyed the fruits of their felony in comfort. The notorious Jeep scandal occurred during Nehru's rule in which kickbacks were paid through V K Krishna Menon for purchasing Jeeps for the military. This was only a harbinger of the Bofors scam under his grandson’s rule.

Nehru's antipathy to men in uniform and his complacence in formulating a credible defence policy is widely known. Singh adds his two cents’ worth here. The military was downgraded and kept under bureaucratic control. During the British rule, a Secretary to the government of India was ranked lower than a Lieutenant General while Nehru made him on par with the General. He abolished the post of commander-in-chief and made the President of India the supreme commander-in-chief, but this was largely ceremonial. Pakistan feared Indian military, but Nehru feared it even more for their potential for staging a military coup. He starved them of equipment. One battalion of the Indian army went into the Battle for Goa in PT shoes due to lack of supplies. Only fifteen per cent of defence requirements were produced in India, but government opposed their import citing dearth of foreign exchange. Nehru's two-fold military doctrine was ridiculously childish. He held that wars were evil and that India had no enemy to fear. He had drugged not only the civil administration but also the armed services into supine inactivity.

Singh claims that he has provided an academic and unbiased analysis of the different facets of Nehru, rather than a biography. While the truth of his assertions is undisputed, his slight anti-Nehru bias is clearly discernible. The book has included a whole lot of letters and little known correspondences Nehru had had with various leaders. The letters between Nehru and Patel serve as a model for new leaders on how to make decent and dignified debate with their political opponents. We also see that cordial salutations like ‘My dear Jawaharlal ji’ and ‘My dear Rajendra Babu’ between Nehru and Rajendra Prasad slowly giving way for ‘My dear Prime Minister’ and ‘My dear President’ as the years went by. The book also includes some rare photographs. It is a credit to the author that he does not mention the personal vagaries of Nehru such as the Edwina affair.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 3 Star

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