The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947

Title: The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947

Author: Ian Copland

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 1999 (First)

ISBN: 9788175960640

Pages: 302

 

V P Menon, an enterprising official in the British-Indian administration rose to everlasting fame as the linchpin of the Herculean task of annexation of the native kingdoms to the nascent dominion of India. About 565-odd states were thus made to accede to India, making it a continuous political entity for the first time in history. We now know about the personal vanities and political aspirations of these princes from a nationalistic perspective which usually put them as roadblocks to national integration. It is time to get a view from the British side that saw the nationalists and princes as two sides of the same coin. The maharajas have been maligned and marginalized by professional historians and this book is an attempt to put the record straight. The native states comprised two-fifths of the land area and a third of the population. This book handles the three decades from 1917 to 1947 and can be conceptually separated into three periods. In the first period, the princes realised the folly of remaining as individuals and became part of the Chamber of Princes to collectively bargain with the British. In the second, this chamber actively participated in the negotiations for an all-India federation of states as a first step to dominion status. The final period shows the fundamentally altered system of things after the Second World War and how the native states had to accede to the successor states one by one. Ian Copland is an associate professor of history at Monash University, Australia and is the author of several books on imperialism and colonialism.

 

Copland provides a clear picture of how the Indian states came to rest under the colonial empire’s wings without much fuss. Earlier, the British used to annex the states under one pretext or another. But after the 1857 Rebellion – in which most states remained friendly with the British – the colonial masters began to appreciate the element of stability these princes provided and stopped the practice of annexation. Thereafter, they remained as the paramount power and very gradually chipped away the powers of sovereignty that originally rested with the princes. Between 1878 and 1886, most states were compelled to relinquish control over their post and telegraph networks. In 1879, states were prohibited from exporting salt manufactured in their territories. From 1877, states were deprived of civil and criminal jurisdiction over railways passing through their land. British-Indian currency became legal tender in all states throughout the subcontinent and most states signed away their right to mint coinage. After 1879, freedom to import weapons for state police forces was steadily curtailed. The princes needed permission from the colonial authority for employing foreigners or making foreign travel themselves.

 

After Curzon’s exit as viceroy, the British initiated an effort to bring in constitutional reforms designed to ensure native participation in the administration of India. More administrative freedom was granted to the states in a policy of laissez faire. It is to be clarified here that states referred to native kingdoms and provinces mean the regions directly ruled by the British. The rulers had extended great help in the imperial war effort during the First World War in the form of men, materials and monetary resources. Consequently, the Montagu Declaration of 1917 envisaged exclusive consultation with princes on administrative reforms. The rulers of middling states like Bikaner, Alwar, Patiala and Nawanagar formed a committee to liaise with the British while larger states like Hyderabad and Mysore kept a safe distance. A 120-seat Chamber of Princes (COP) was set up as part of the reform package to advise the viceroy on all political questions relevant to the states. However, its effectiveness was rather limited as it was dominated by middle-sized, mainly Rajput rulers whose states were situated within relatively easy travelling distance by motor car from Delhi, who were fluent in English and who had acquired political skills by attending wartime Chiefs’ conferences.

 

Contrary to popular perception, not all of the rulers were against the nationhood of India or the growth of nationalism. Officials performing as diwans sometimes encouraged their rulers to show a national bias. Kailash Haksar and K M Panikkar, Diwans of Gwalior and Bikaner respectively, are notable here. Princes made parleys with Congress leaders prior to the Round Table Conferences (RTC) convened to chalk out plans for constitutional reforms. But Congress ruled itself out of the equation by deciding to withdraw from the constitutional process and commence a campaign of civil disobedience. It is an unfortunate chapter in Indian history that Congress recused itself out of two RTCs demanding the privilege of sole representation of the Indian people. The princes participated in all three RTCs. The Chamber (COP) was also riven with bickering over joining an all-India federation. They proposed a 250-seated upper house for the new central legislature. This was the forerunner of the current Rajya Sabha. Enactment of the Government of India Act in 1935 paved the way for a national federation, but the federation was to come into being only if a majority of the states had signified their adherence to it by acceding. Just when the discussions heated up, Congress reversed its policy of non-interference in native states at its session held at Haripura in 1938 under pressure from the socialist clique in the party. Satyagrahas of local subjects with outside help were staged. States were quickly destabilized, and the rulers were saved only with British support, but they could not forget how close they had come to catastrophe. Reluctance to join the federation intensified as a result. Exactly at this moment, the Second World War broke out and all reforms were relegated to cold storage.

 

This book displays how critically Indian independence was linked to the 1945 general elections in Britain that returned a Labour government under Clement Attlee and had practically nothing to credit Congress’ failed Quit India initiative of 1942. This put the rulers also under great hardship. The post-war Labour government, unlike its predecessor, had few inhibiting personal ties with the Indian princes. They were not ideologically well disposed to the perpetuation of monarchies. The princes thought that the treaties they had signed with the British long ago would compel their masters to guarantee the survival of native states. But these were made more than a century before and had long ceased to be appropriate to the conditions of the modern world. Practically, Attlee left the states to their own devices. The rising Pakistan demand had cast its dark shadow on the unity among the princes too. The CoP split in April 1947 and contrary to the Nawab of Bhopal’s – the Chancellor of the Chamber – entreaties, several member states joined India’s constituent assembly on their own discretion. From this moment onwards, the Chamber stopped to be politically relevant.

 

Then we come to the final episode in which the states first acceded to India, then merged among themselves to become viable groups and the final merger with the provinces by extinguishing royal houses in 1956. Viceroy Mountbatten’s support to Indian unification by keeping a tight leash on recalcitrant rulers is mentioned in this book. He applied a subtle, gentlemanly but relentless pressure on the states. In a hastily convened summit of the Chamber on Jul 25, 1947, he promised them that they need only to cede control on three subjects – defence, communication and foreign policy – to the new national government. Anyway, they had already ceded these three subjects to the British as the paramount power. Mountbatten then forced their hand by asking them to take a quick decision as the offer might not last. His political advisor, Conrad Corfield, opposed this direct intervention but was asked to accept early retirement. Copland then notes with obvious regret that the promises extended by both British and Indian leaders to the princes were not honoured. In place of their kingdoms, all merging rulers were given handsome tax-free pensions, free lifetime medical care for self and family, free electricity, exemption from customs duty, the right to go about with armed escort, a state funeral with military honours and qualified immunity from civil prosecution. Some rulers were incorporated into the new machinery as Rajpramukh (governor) but even this was taken away in 1956.

 

The book contains a number of amusing anecdotes of princely indulgences in the first few chapters. Such extravagance was, of course, borne by the taxpayers. The book is easily readable and the style and structure is very appealing. The only drawback is that footnotes are given at the bottom of each page which sometimes grows to the middle of the page. This affects readability. This work is very rare in the genre of Indian independence in that it presents an arena that is not visited by regular historians.

 

This book is highly recommended.

 

Rating: 4 Star