Author: J. Sai Deepak
Publisher: Bloomsbury, 2022 (First)
ISBN: 9789354353017
Pages: 616
The
traditional accounts of India’s freedom struggle make us believe that Muslim
League raised the demand of Pakistan with the Lahore Declaration in Mar 1940
and thereby creating the Two-Nation theory. It then grew so strong in the
coming years as to receive acceptance even from Gandhi a few years later. As a
result, the country was partitioned in 1947. This argument posits that the
Two-Nation theory was a political idea put forward by the Muslim League, which
was a political party. However, it was not difficult for discerning readers to
shred this popular, comforting and infantile fiction to pieces with a little
application of common sense. This book attributes the theory as a purely
religious one having its origins in the minds of a few bigoted men after the
disintegration of Mughal Empire by the middle of the eighteenth century. It is
a fundamental principle in Islam that asks its followers to reside in a country
where the Sharia law is in place. If it is not, they have two options. One is
to fight their way to power by overthrowing the rulers through a holy war and
make Sharia rule the land. But if the ruling agency is very powerful, this may
not be possible and the believers are then exhorted to migrate to a country
where Islamic law is in place. When Mughals ruled India in their prime, the
entire land lay under the yoke of Sharia and offered the perfect abode of
domicile for Muslims. With the decline of the Mughals, the Marathas, Jats, Sikhs
and Rajputs assumed dominance in North India. Islamic revivalist movements came
up in this period as a response to this loss of political power which grew into
prominence under different guises in the coming centuries. Muslims were
pacified under British ascendancy after 1857, but as soon as democratic reforms
began to be implemented, they feared Hindu oppression owing to their superior
numbers. As far as religious principles went, the British were at least People
of the Book, while Hindus were ‘despised polytheists’. The Two-Nation theory thus
originated from the reluctance of pious Muslims to live under Hindu rule which
came into being in the eighteenth century. This book is the second in the
trilogy on India’s constitutional development written by J. Sai Deepak and
asserts that the Two-Nation theory cast its shadows on every political
development such as the partition of Bengal, establishment of separate electorate
for Muslims and the Khilafat Movement. The first volume was reviewed earlier in
this blog.
What
makes Sai Deepak stand out from the crowd of authors who had handled this
subject earlier is his original thinking which found the real origins of the
Two-Nation theory to the collapse of the most powerful Muslim empire in India –
the Mughals. After its disintegration, the Islamic scholars sought solace in
going back to the fundamentals of the religion and to revive it thereby. Shah
Waliullah Dehlawi is the most prominent cleric of this period who propounded
the bigoted tenets of Wahhabism which he encountered during his stay in Arabia.
He exhorted the Muslims of the subcontinent not to integrate into society,
since contact with Hindus would contaminate their Islamic purity. He urged them
to see themselves as part of a global Ummah (religious community). He mandated
them to follow the customs and mores of the Prophet. He was such a Sunni
hardliner that he allowed Shias to celebrate their festivals in public but only
with strict moderation. The Hindu infidels were not even permitted this somewhat
shard of a privilege. Waliullah hated India, his homeland, so much that he
invited the Afghan warlord Ahmed Shah Durrani to invade India to teach the
infidels a lesson. In his letter, he detailed the strengths and weaknesses of
Marathas and Jats. This was how the Two-Nation theory sprouted in India.
The
author then lists out the religious movements that spread in all parts of the
country like wildfire. The Faraizi Movement in Bengal founded by Haji
Shariatullah in the 1820s was a violent organisation. Atrocities against Hindus
spread in Bengal as its consequence, including destruction of temples and
idols. Under Syed Ahmed Barelwi’s lead, Muslims in Bengal joined pan-Indian
networks to fight common enemies such as the Sikh kingdom in Punjab. With
Wahhabi influence, it became a practice in some Muslim families to earmark a
portion of their earnings for contribution to jihad or to send their men to
participate in it at least for a few months. Wahhabi thought was taken forward
by other schools such as Ahl-i-Hadith, Deobandi, Barelwi, Nadwah and Aligarh
movements.
Clubbing
the Aligarh Movement with other hard-line religious associations may surprise
some naïve souls. It is true that Aligarh was the only place where Islamic
teaching was juxtaposed with modern Western learning, but the religious axis on
which it turned was the same as the others. The combined effect of Syed Ahmed
Khan and Jamal al-Din Afghani was the simultaneous growth of Muslim nationalism
and pan-Islamism. Khan openly professed that Muslims are a separate nation in
India and his reconciliation with pan-Islamism did not bode well for India.
Liberal thinkers attribute all the blame for religious unrest in India to the
‘Divide-and-Rule’ policy of the British. Here, Deepak makes a sagacious
observation. To blame the ‘Divide-and-Rule’ policy is to wistfully and
willfully ignore uncomfortable and ‘unsecular’ facts. The British policy
succeeded only because there were serious, pre-existing and irreconcilable
religious, cultural, linguistic and civilizational fissures between the two
communities. We were divided and they
ruled.
The
partition of Bengal was the definite moment in which the Muslim nation first
asserted itself. This critical episode is given a fitting coverage in the book.
The partition was more on religious lines than administrative convenience as
the newly formed province of East Bengal and Assam was having a Muslim majority
and became a centre of consolidation of Muslim interests and the point of
convergence of Muslim organisations from across the country. Muslim
associations in the new province celebrated Oct 16, 1905, the day on which the
partition was officially declared, as a day of rejoicing. Congress and other
Hindu organisations strongly opposed the measure and the agitation continued
till it was partially withdrawn in 1911. However, Bengali Muslims stayed away
from anti-partition protests and remained loyal to the British. Meanwhile, the
British introduced reservation for Muslims in government jobs in the new
province. Ulemas toured the province with incendiary speeches that led to widespread
attacks on Hindus, especially women. This was a dress rehearsal for the ethnic
pogrom against Hindus unleashed in 1946-47 in the same regions. When the
partition was annulled, Bihar and Orissa was separated from the parent
province. Now, the unity of Bengal was ensured, but the entire province then
became one with a Muslim majority.
While
the Bengal partition produced a physical shape of the Muslim nation, the 1909
Morley-Minto reforms outstretched its vicious tentacles with separate
electorates for Muslims. This sordid chapter also finds prominent mention in
the book. While all other minorities such as Christians, Parsees, Jews and
others were treated as members of the general electorate, Muslims as a
community was offered a separate electorate. In this manner, Muslim separatism
was constitutionally cemented in the political psyche of India. Not content
with that, Muslims were also given more seats than their population numbers
warranted in view of the ‘historical and
political superiority of Muslims’. The Congress, especially its moderate
faction, had taken colonization as a time for beneficial political
apprenticeship and wanted to present a united front to Britain to secure
self-government. Naturally, they were willing to make critical concessions to
Muslim demands to keep them along. The Muslim League realized this weakness
early on and exploited it to the hilt. Deepak establishes that appeasement of
the Muslim League was entrenched in Congress well before Gandhi took
centre-stage. Jinnah assumed an amphibian role at this time by becoming a
member of both Congress and the League and put his membership of the Congress
to good use of Muslim community by softening the opposition within Congress to
separate electorates for Muslims.
Another
major contribution of the book is its categorical establishment that Gandhi was
not the originator of Congress’ Muslim appeasement. It started right from that
party’s birth in 1885 and went into overdrive after Muslim League’s formation
in 1906. At least in one instance, it went far more than the League was willing
to go – on the issue of the fate of the Turkish sultan who was also the caliph
of Muslims who was defeated by Britain and its allies in the First World War.
Gandhi’s rise as a national leader was significantly owed to the Khilafat
Movement. His agitation against the Rowlatt Act too was made possible due to
the support of the Khilafatists. This was the first time Muslims came out on
the warpath after 1857, but unfortunately, it was for a cause not even remotely
connected to India’s destiny. In fact, its pan-Islamic objectives threatened
the national aspirations of India. Maulana Muhammad Ali declared that he will
assist the Afghans if they invaded India. This open threat alienated a sizeable
cross-section of Hindu supporters. Within no time, the Khilafat agitation changed
track and turned into forced conversion and ethnic cleansing of Hindus,
especially in Malabar in 1921. The horrifying fact was that the Khilafat
leaders refused to condemn the brutal atrocities even after they were widely
published by the Press. Maulana Hazrat Mohani, who was one of the founders of
the Communist Party of India (CPI), informed in a meeting that ‘since the
Moplahs suspected their Hindu neighbours of colluding with the government, they
were justified in presenting the Quran to the Hindus. And if the Hindus became
Musalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary change of faith and
not forcible conversion (p.469). This was how the Khilafat leaders actually
justified the murder, rape and forced conversion while the Congress leaders continued
to keep their eyes firmly shut.
Another
idea this book conveys is the longevity of the fundamental Indic consciousness
that animates the Indian communal being. Indic consciousness was able to
produce society-based institutions and individuals who constantly and
uncompromisingly advanced the Indic civilizational cause and space in the two
waves of Middle Eastern and European colonialism. This ability preserved the
Consciousness then but is now dulled and stifled under the third wave of
colonization, namely, under the Nehruvian Marxist/post-colonial establishment
which even refuses to acknowledge the Middle Eastern colonialism which ravaged
the country perhaps much more detrimentally than the British.
This
book is rather huge even though it covers only the period from 1905 to 1924. It
is a worthy follower of the first book of the trilogy – India that is Bharat – in content, but rather less enjoyable due to
the frequent and very long extracts from speeches, books, memorials and
debates. At least a quarter of the book is filled with verbatim reproduction of
speeches on 1909 reforms and the Khilafat. This is very tiring for the reader
as the author seems to have taken a temporary leave of absence and left the
readers to deal directly with the jargon and vocabulary of politicians who
lived more than a century ago. The book consistently uses the terms
Bharat/Bharatiya for India/Indian which proclaims its firm mooring to Indian,
er, Bharatiya consciousness. The author also emphasizes the Hindu roots of
Sikhs and how fanatical Muslims treated both as the same. The unseating of the
Khalsa kingdom of Lahore was a sworn objective of Wahhabi extremists in the
early half of the nineteenth century. This is especially valid as the
Khalistanis are now hand in glove with the Wahhabis.
The
book is highly recommended.
Rating: 3 Star
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