Separatism among Indian Muslims

Title: Separatism among Indian Muslims – The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923
Author: Francis Robinson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, 1997 (First published 1993)
ISBN: 9780195631265
Pages: 469

The plain fact that India was partitioned in 1947 on the basis of religion requires researchers to analyse the reasons for fissure among the major communities of Hindus and Muslims and the growth of separatism among the Muslims. Several attempts have been made, emphasizing on the political, social, religious, economic and every conceivable parameter on which you can classify human societies. This book sets out to explain the emergence of Muslim separatism largely in terms of the interactions between colonial elites and the colonial state, set against the broader contexts of Hindu and Muslim revivalism. It narrates the communal story between two important failures of Indian political life – the 1857 Rebellion and the Khilafat agitation of the 1920s. These six decades – it seems obvious now – shaped the destiny of the later political frontiers of the subcontinent. It’s a mixture of governmental patronage favouring a community first and then transferring it to its rival. A major theme of the work is the Muslim petulance at permanently losing the privileges they had enjoyed unopposed over a millennium in India. They had initially hoped that when the British left Indian shores at last, power would be handed back to the Muslim dynasties from whom the British had gained control over India. The 1857 Uprising was in fact staged to hoist the Mughal emperor as the nominal sovereign of the country. However, with constitutional reforms getting progressively wider and more inclusive, it dawned on them that the British wanted to devolve more power to the people and eventually to leave the power in full in their hands in a distant future. In such a scenario, the Hindus who constituted a majority would naturally be able to handle more power. The Muslim reluctance to share power with the Hindus lay at the root of separatism and this book spells out how it grew in the sixty years after the 1857 Rebellion. Francis Robinson is a British historian and academic who specialize in the history of South Asia and Islam. He has been twice the president of the Royal Asiatic Society.

It may seem strange to us now why the author had chosen a province whose post-partition position was never in doubt and which had a large Hindu majority all along. Robinson clears this up with an explainer on why he had selected UP as his field of study. The Muslims in UP (then called United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) were at the heart of Muslim separatism unlike Punjab or Bengal. Except Jinnah, they led the Muslim organizations in Indian politics. The secretaries of the All India Muslim League were from UP in the first two decades of its existence. They also dominated the Central Khilafat Committee that played a supra-provincial role in whipping up communal frenzy that ended up in gruesome communal riots. The region of UP was the traditional centre of Muslim rule and civilization in India. For eight centuries before the British dislodged the Mughals, Muslims had been the dominant group though a minority in numbers. They were not at all backward, as being suggested by some of the Left-Islamist cabal of historians. They were a major landholding group occupying approximately one-fifth of the land in the province. They possessed many of the largest estates running into thousands of acres of prime fertile land. They were able to elect 40 per cent of the members in Oudh district boards. The Muslims constituted 35 per cent of all government jobs while in the judicial services, they formed the majority share of 56 per cent. 54 per cent of the tahsildars were Muslims as also most of the kotwals (town police chiefs). This was while their ratio in population was only 12 per cent!

Consider for an instant the imaginary case of Hindu upper castes who predominated the British-Indian bureaucracy opposing the program of providing reservation for lower castes in government jobs and education. How vociferously would modern society have called their hypocrisy out? A similar situation prevailed in nineteenth century UP when the Muslims who dominated the provincial establishment of Mohammedan rulers grudged the increased participation the British were offering to Hindus. The Muslims demurred to send their children to government schools for fear of ‘mingling with students far below them in social rank’. Their religious obligations compelled them to make their boys learn the Koran before they learned anything else, and by the time they had done this, it was usually too late to learn anything else. Their religious leaders believed western learning to be incompatible with Islam. Robinson also describes the major issues that fused the Muslim elite together. In the 1840s, the policy of teaching Persian was stopped and the government switched over to Urdu (not English, as it is widely believed). This concession was to mollify the Muslims as the Urdu language was to be written in the Persian script only. The Urdu-speaking elite identified four threats to their continued domination: education policy, bureaucratic reforms, elective government and Hindu revivalism. In 1900, the sole use of Persian script was modified by allowing the Nagri script as well. This decision which was in the interest of 90 per cent of the population was deeply resented by the Muslims who dreamed to continue their iron-fisted hegemony till the end of days.

This book strongly rejects ‘Divide and Rule’ as a policy deliberately adopted by the British. The real problem confronting Britain was ‘not how to divide and rule India, but how to rule a divided India’ (p.164). If British policy exacerbated Indian social disharmony, it was ‘more out of ignorance or innocence than malice’. Besides, British public opinion was strongly pro-Muslim. The Times, which really informed and led the mass of newspapers about Indian matters, was a great Muslim partisan (p.169). Robinson identifies fear of Muslims that really formed the bedrock of British policy towards them. To deal with them, government adopted special measures and made special concessions, which was not to set them against Hindus that was only a side effect (p.131-2). What the colonialists feared was fanaticism of a terrible order which British administrators clearly feared. UP Lieutenant Governor Anthony MacDonnell objectively spotted it in Muslim government servants. He was sure that ‘in times of Muslim agitation, they did not pull their weight. This was a danger to security of the establishment and their strong position in government service had to be redressed’. However, the author finds this prudent official to be ‘prejudicial’ (p.43). Robinson again remarks that British policy to Muslims was influenced by ‘the publicists’ pen and the assassin’s dagger’. The Chief Justice of Bengal was killed on the steps of the High Court and Viceroy Mayo himself was stabbed to death by a Muslim convict. A little time before his death, Mayo had advised his subordinates that being constantly on the lookout for disturbances within Muslims was one of the most important duties of every officer, civil or military in India (p.100). The provocation could be anything, even as mild as criticising their religion. Pandit Lekh Ram criticized Islam and appealed them to become Aryas. The author then makes the Muslim attack that followed somewhat respectable with the strange remark that ‘eventually, one Muslim was provoked enough to kill him’ (p.68 footnote).

This book takes a detailed look at the factors that prompted Muslims to demand unreasonable constitutional guarantees for themselves. This is a reflection on the collapse of Muslim power in north India that exercised a suffocating dominance over the Hindus who were not allowed to exercise any position of meaningful power or the free practice of their religion. By the nineteenth century, the Hindus saw their chance and began to use them. The divisional commander of Agra observed: The Hindus here, as elsewhere, have begun to assert themselves, and will not now willingly acquiesce, as they appear formerly to have done, in the superiority of the Mohammedans (p.80). This, in a nutshell, is the real and true cause of Muslim separatism in India. An oppressed majority boldly claiming their just share from the hands of a tyrannical minority elite would be glorified as a victory of social justice a century later but this apt epithet is used in India only after carefully asserting which party is the oppressor. With the progressive widening of self-rule and the flicker of democracy gaining traction in the country, the Muslims feared that their claims would be ignored and discriminated against. They opposed elections and representative government as totally unsuited to India. In fact, Muslim elite opposed competitive exams in the civil service too. The principal of Aligarh college told the government that competitive exams would flood the service with men from lower provinces dispossessing Muslims and upper classes in general, such as the Rajput aristocracy (p.118). Syed Ahmed was even more vociferous who tried to provoke regional animosities among Hindus and commented that ‘Bengalis who crawl under his chair at the sight of a table knife would be placed over Rajputs who have not forgotten the swords of their ancestors’ (p.119). Hindus also showed signs of highhandedness. Municipal authorities dominated by elected Hindu councillors tried to shut down meat shops selling beef. Other than this, no religious discrimination is mentioned in the book. In return, cows were openly killed after Muslims regained power in some municipalities.

Robinson evaluates in detail the contributions of Syed Ahmed Khan and the thrust he had imported to the education and political activity of Muslims. Even with the above disparaging remarks about Bengalis, the Muslims of Bengal continued to support him as they knew in their heart that the comment was only intended to create rift among the majority community. The demand was to get enhanced representation in provincial councils, district boards and municipal bodies on account of their past ‘historical importance’ (p.123). This was a euphemism for demanding a quantum of seats unreasonable to and in far excess of their numerical position. It may also be kept in mind that when Pakistan was actually formed, the minorities in that country were not allowed any of the rights the Muslims enjoyed in undivided India. The Muslim educational conference instituted by Khan covertly played politics and opposed Congress. In 1906 this led to the creation of the Muslim League. The Aligarh college – later university – was the base from which a UP Muslim elite group led a Muslim political party in the province and in India as a whole. The British propped up Syed Ahmed and Aligarh college and indirectly assisted in the birth of Muslim political doctrine and separatism. On the level of the divisive sentiment he generated, Syed Ahmed Khan may be termed the Jinnah of the nineteenth century.

The author correctly identifies the concession of separate electorates as tipping point that vindicated the Muslim sense of exclusiveness and belligerence whose natural conclusion was the division of the country. The British tried at first to deny demands for separate electorates as this very concept was alien to the fundamental principles of democracy. The scheme envisaged two votes for Muslims – one in the separate constituency and the other in the general category – while the Hindus had only one. This was so even in East Bengal where Muslims comprised 53 per cent of the population where this high share ensured that a candidate not favoured by Muslims cannot win even the general seat. Persistent pressure forced the government to allocate double the number of seats earlier promised to Muslims as separate electorates. This was in the face of open threats of the Muslim League that their ‘good behaviour could not be guaranteed if the government did not concede this’ (p.158). After attaining this goal, the UP Muslim party was separated into two groups referred to as ‘Old’ and ‘Young’ parties. The ‘Old’ consisted mainly of aristocrats and landowners while the ‘Young’ included professionals and journalists. The ‘Young’ was fiercely bigoted with a pan-Islamic outlook. Issues of Turkey and other Islamic states were foremost in their concern. The Lucknow Pact with Congress was an attempt by the ‘Young’ to come out in the political mainstream and to restrain the gradual ascent of the ulema in the party. It gained them a lot of other concessions from Congress and again increased the Muslim seats as part of the 1919 Montford reforms.

The most important contribution of this book is a concise narrative on the rise of pan-Islamic sentiment among Muslims and the Khilafat agitation it led to. Pan-Islamic outlook is a basic requirement demanded by the religion and almost all the leaders cherished it in their bosom. Mahomed Ali, who grew to be the tallest leader of that time, was a willing proponent from the early years of public life. He set up an Indo-Ottoman colonization society with the aim of starting an Islamic settlement at Adana in Turkey composed of Indian and Turkish Muslims. However, his taste for modernity and refinement can be gauged from his pithy remark on political adjustments: “Constitutions, like pretty women, are meant to be violated” (p.362). The World War I and related developments in Ottoman Empire radicalised Indian Muslims in an extraordinary way. Even women were agitated to an extent that Harcourt Butler, the lieutenant governor of UP, reported that his priority was to keep Muslim women right as they can force their husbands to do something for Islam and that no government in India can control a combination of Muslim priests and women (p.294). The ulema saw their chance for taking a plunge into mainstream politics. The Young party men provided a guiding hand to them. This alliance of the ulema with secular politicians was marked by the contrast between their ultimate objectives. The secular group wanted a slice of power for themselves, but the ulema wanted nothing less than the eventual enforcement of the sharia in India like what the Taliban practises at present in Afghanistan. Their interest was in protecting traditional Islam and their position in it. The ulema were most active in Khilafat which was an agitation for restoring the territory and title of the Turkish sultan who was defeated in World War I. They had the most to gain from non-cooperation. They made donations to non-cooperation movement a form of zakat making it obligatory for believers. Going a step further, the Muttafiqa fatwa signed by 500 ulema made non-cooperation itself a religious duty. They were very particular that Hindus join them in this struggle and was instrumental in persuading Gandhi to put the final shape to the agitation. The book also includes some curious examples of firebrand ulema developing feet of clay at a mere raid on their premises by law enforcement. Abdul Bari was unnerved by CID men poking around Firangi Mahal. He rushed to Nainital where the lieutenant governor was staying, professed his innocence, declared his loyalty and at the end of the interview broke down completely (p.294).

Robinson illustrates the fanatic spirit that enveloped the Khilafat movement which turned against Hindus who were in fact supporting it. Abdul Bari declared that they are determined to ‘fight the enemy of Islam whether he be in Anatolia or Arabia or Agra or Benares’. The Jamiat ul-Ulema supported the Moplahs who converted Hindus by force in Malabar in 1921 (p.338). The Central Khilafat Committee even offered them financial support. When pressure was applied by indignant Congress leaders, they grudgingly offered a small amount of money for the Hindu victims too. A peculiar feature of Muslim politics was evident then. When the hard-line fanatics took over the reins, the so called ‘secular’ Muslim politicians acted as broker between the Congress and the hardliners instead of opposing the latter on ideological lines. Many Muslims rose to high leadership positions at the central and provincial levels. The Congress itself had only four Muslim presidents from its inception in 1885 to 1920. But between 1921 and 1923, three out of its four presidents were Muslims.

As with other liberal scholars, Robinson also dusts off the old and convenient delusion that Muslim politicians were driven by selfish self-interest rather than religious bigotry. Hard-core Muslims had prepared a migration plan to Afghanistan forsaking the British empire to protest against its cavalier treatment of the Turkish Caliph. This important incident which involved the deaths of thousands of people is not mentioned in the book. The author finally concludes that the Muslims in UP were not a nation by the standards applied to modern Europe as they had no racial homogeneity, little common history and many conflicting interests. The book is noted for its detached perspective and helps to bring in some objectivity when the events considered are still capable of arousing much passion on both sides of the border between India and Pakistan. The author has thoroughly researched population and job data community-wise and has included many informative tables categorizing relevant information. It also incorporates the concise biographies of 61 prominent leaders of the Young Party, 44 from Old Party, 12 ulema and 21 other men of importance. Raja Sivaprasad is the only Hindu who had the good fortune to enter this list. Bibliography of the book is impressively comprehensive.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 4 Star