Title: The Muslims of British India
Author: Peter Hardy
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press 1998 (First published 1972)
ISBN: 9788175960268
Pages: 306
Partition of India into two states in 1947 was followed by one of the
most cruel massacres and transfer of populations between the new states. About
half a million people lost their lives and 14 million changed their domicile in
the largest human migration in history. Killing and exodus in the name of
religion may appear to be ridiculous to those who live in secular societies
where the role of the state and the faith are clearly made non-concentric. But
not so in India and in most of the Asian countries. Readers may wonder what
prompted the inhabitants of undivided India to go for the jugular of their
neighbours with so deadly a passion. Was it so tough a job for the followers of
the two religions to live together in harmony? Many history books tried to
answer this question before and since the partition of India. Unfortunately for
us, Indian historians come in three distinct varieties with predictable literary
output. Muslim historians come out with the Muslim version of the debate, while
Hindu historians publish arguments contrary to them. The third genre – the
leftist historians – follow a definitely anti-Hindu, but not quite pro-Muslim
stance, in step with their political ideology. The truth gets buried in the melee.
So it is a refreshing change to read a work of history coming from the pen of a
British author. Naturally, we get to read many episodes in India’s struggle for
independence that has not been revealed to us before through the mainstream
media. No mention about the author or his profile is given in the book and
curiously, it couldn’t be accessed online too! An aura of mystery hence
surrounds the figure of Peter Hardy, but no such confusion is observed in his
lucid interpretation of the events that led to India’s partition and the role
of Muslims in it.
The transition of a powerful community from the privilege of ruling the
country to being undistinguished inhabitants who were forced to work for their
livelihood is presented in the first part of the book. The century after the
death of Aurangzeb in 1707 saw the country moving from Islamic rule to the
British. This marked the end of seven centuries of Muslim rule which was based
on military occupation. Local aristocrats were invariably officers of the
garrison. When the British established their ascendancy, these people lost
their way of life as well as their livelihood. Out of the Muslim masses which
constituted a fifth of the population of British India, the majority lived the
same life as their Hindu bretheren in terms of their hand to mouth subsistence.
But the aristocrats commanded better visibility and more faithfully represented
the Muslim sentiment. British rule thus brought in commercial enterprise as the
prime economic activity in place of militarism. The prevalence of robbery and
general failure of law and order in the country is to be properly understood in
the backdrop of the horde of unemployed soldiers roaming the countryside.
Pindaris robbed wayfarers and many of them were Muslims. Hardy blows away the
myth that Muslims were at the receiving end of the land reforms instituted by
the English East India Company. Presenting statistics pulled out from land
revenue records, it is convincingly proved that both Hindus and Muslims
suffered in equal measure before the 1857 Mutiny. Coupled with these factors,
the rise in arrogance of the British should also be identified for the
resentment that was brewing in the subject population. As the Mughal power
waned, the British gradually stepped into their shoes. Outward appearances of
obeisance to the Mughal emperor was continued for some time, but later, he was
sidelined in a humiliating manner. The time was ripe for an outburst, but the
British utterly failed to see it coming.
The rebellion in 1857 may be
termed as the single event in history (if ever there was one), that marked the
transition of India from medievalism to modernity. The age old dispensations of
power were removed in one stroke without any prospect of return. About 30
princes of the Mughal line were killed and the emperor exiled to Burma. It was
clear to the Muslims that power could not be obtained by force as long as the
British were on the scene which was thought at that time to be ever lasting.
Two streams of counter-opinions circulated among the Muslim community. One
section found the country to be dar al-Harb (abode of enmity) instead of dar
al-Islam (abode of peace) and insisted on the impractical policy of migration
to other lands where the sharia law prevailed. The other group, led by
modern-minded individuals like Sir Saiyid Ahmed Khan articulated for
reconciliation with the British. Being a devout Muslim, who even postulated
that the sun circulates around the earth, Sir Saiyid identified the issue
facing the Muslim society as not the hegemony of the British, which was a fait
accompli, but rather the ascendancy of Hindus if the British were to concede the
demand of self-representation in the legislature, judiciary and administration.
The political ethos prevailing in contemporary Europe didn’t encourage the
demand for representation of religious communities. This is the background for
the origin of the two-nation theory. If the Hindus and Muslims constituted two
nations of the European model, it naturally calls for two separate geographical
enclosures for them. Saiyid Amir Ali of Orissa founded the National Mohammedan
Association in 1877, which eventually paved the way for the establishment of
the Muslim League in 1906. When Indian National Congress was founded in 1885,
Muslims under Saiyid Ahmed Khan opposed it on all fronts. Even Badruddin
Tyabji, who was one of the earliest Congress presidents, secretly sympathized
with the Islamic viewpoint.
Hardy tells the tale of how the
Muslims grouped together to become a separate nation within the bounds of a
geographical frontier in which Hindus formed the majority. The root of the
problem lay in the 18th century when the collapse of Islamic regimes
in power and prestige, coupled with the rise of Maratha and Sikh powers
prompted the nebulous Islamic sentiment to solidify at last. Shah Wali-Allah, a
Delhi scholar, encouraged Muslims to follow a fundamentalist order. His son,
Shah Abd al-Aziz even termed India a dar al-Harb in which the Muslims are
enjoined by religious law to wage holy war against the oppressors. Embers of
communal passion were stoked by the puritanical writings of Saiyid Ahmed of Rae
Bareilly. Muslim resentment began surfacing in violent measures. Dudu Miyan of
Bengal accused the government of spending the tax revenue collected from Muslim
peasants for Hindu religious rituals. Khalifas were nominated in Bengal
villages in which the rebel Tutu Mir killed cows in the open and desecrated
local temples with its blood. 19th century saw the Muslim ulema –
the priesthood – gaining strength and the establishment of Dar ul-Ulum at
Deoband. Fatwas were sought by the faithful on all matters of personal
interactions that often verged on the ridiculous. A scholar, Abd al-Haiy once
enunciated a fatwa that a man accidentally touching, in conditions of domestic
overcrowding, his foster-brother’s wife’s mother’s thigh is guilty of zina
(unlawful intercourse)! Muslim nationalism changed its track again in the 20th
century. What they feared most was the prospect of living in a democratic India
after the British had left, and subject to the majority Hindu population who
would obviously be controlling the legislature. For Muslims, slavery to the
British was infinitely more preferable than the partnership with Hindus on the
political plane. The acid test to determine where the sympathy of Indian
Muslims lay was the response to Turkey’s defeat in the 1914 World War. As the
sultan was also the caliph who controlled Islam’s holiest places, his miserable
defeat in the war and humiliating peace treaties antagonized the Indian Muslims
who called Khilafat agitation to demand justice to Turkey. This had Congress
support, who believed this to be an opportunity to rope in Muslims for the
first time in India’s historical struggle for independence. Incidentally, it
turned out to be the last as well. The Muslim leaders were interested only in
the fate of Turkey and they didn’t care a damn about India’s destiny. Maulana
Mohammed Ali, one of the leaders of the movement, openly declared that helping
fellow Muslims was the foremost obligation of a Muslim and should the Amir of
Afghanistan declare a jihad against India and attack it, Indian Muslims would
wholeheartedly join the aggressor (p.195)! Instead of territorial nationalism,
they opted for community federalism.
The book is special in the sense
that it exposes the unfamiliar side of many nationalist Muslim leaders, who are
eulogized in official versions of Indian history. The case of Tyabji is noted earlier.
Another shocking expose is that of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad whose credentials
sport a stained look if the author is to be believed. In his book titled Masla-i Khilafat, written to support
Turkey against Britain, Azad reiterates that “God entrusted the vicegerency of this earth to a succession of
different communities, until finally it was entrusted to the community of the
Prophet Muhammad” (p.191). Again, he lays down that “it is the individual duty (farz al-ain) of every Muslim to come to the
aid of any Muslim government under attack from non-Muslims” (p.192). The
mental partition of India had already taken place in the 1920s when the foolish
venture of Khilafat raged in the country, foolish in the sense that when the
Turks regained power under the able leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, one of
his prominent actions was to dethrone the sultan and scrap the title of
Khalifa!
Hardy faithfully presents the
complex web of interactions among the Muslims of British India. Contrary to
popular conception, the community was far from monolithic. Interests of class,
role of education, political organization and level of social awareness are all
neatly addressed by the author. The community reacted differently to the same
impetus in various provinces. It may be remembered that Muslim League couldn’t
command power through popular elections till about a decade from partition. The
author’s use of statistics is wonderfully to the point and establishes his
argument without any further need of query. The sources for these figures are
amazingly diverse, from census figures to voting records to land revenue
records and to results of school/college examinations. Such commendable use of
actual figures is rarely seen in books of history. It is to be stressed here
that the readability is not at all suffered by the use of numbers.
The book is highly recommended.
Rating: 4 Star
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