In the Line of Fire

Title: In the Line of Fire – A Memoir

Author: Pervez Musharraf

Publisher: Simon & Schuster, 2006 (First)

ISBN: 9780743295826

Pages: 352

Of all the rivalries in the world, that between siblings is the most brutal and often sanguinary. Nothing exemplifies this rule better than the case of India and Pakistan, born on consecutive days in August 1947. The birth of the nations was accompanied by communal riots of the worst kind and millions of people were forcibly exchanged between the two nations. After independence, the social and political life of the sister countries diverged considerably. While India consistently followed a democratic path, Pakistan was ravaged by intermittent bouts of military dictatorship. Military is the most prominent institution in Pakistan and its generals routinely meddle with the political establishment in the role of arbitrators or mediators between political parties who are inept and extremely corrupt. It is strange, but true, that Indians are more familiar with the names of Pakistani generals like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, than their own, of which most of the Indians can’t name even three. How this paradigm shift took hold after partition? Musharraf’s memoir is excellent in condensing the history of Pakistan in a nutshell and in describing how he came into power. However, it lacks in analytical skill and is not helpful in answering the above question. The author never rises above the level of a soldier in the entire narrative. Musharraf is an India-hater, expressing his vehement opposition in each of the instances he mentions India. This is quite understandable too, as he himself had migrated to Pakistan during the post-partition trauma. Even with this background, it is commendable that the author has never made any comparison between his country and India anywhere in this book. This work is eminently readable as it explains how power is changed hands so haphazardly and arbitrarily in a country that stockpiles nuclear weapons with none of the bothers of non-proliferation. The greatest service this book offers to the cause of Pakistan is its rhetoric that the majority of people in that country are enlightened moderates and shun terrorism with equal fervor as the rest of the world.

The book is full of self-promotion, hype, masking of vital facts, lies and half-truths. An excellent case in point is Musharraf’s coverage of the Kargil conflict. He begins by asserting fraudulently that Pakistani troops and Kashmiri freedom fighters (his euphemism for terrorists sneaking in from across the border) occupied the forward positions in Kargil in response to an alleged Indian attempt to occupy unguarded positions in winter. What the author fails to mention is that Pakistan army’s maneuver was designed to thwart the civilian Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s overture to India for ensuring peace and a cooperative chapter in the relation between the two countries. What the Pakistan military dreads most is a peaceful relationship with India, as the entire military establishment of Pakistan is built up on fear of India among the masses. People ignore the fact that their army was at the receiving end of one of the world’s worst military defeats when very senior officials with about 91,000 troops unconditionally and meekly surrendered to the Indian Army in East Pakistan in 1971. The rest of the Pakistan army fumed over the incident – as the author also did – but watched impotently as their country was cut neatly into two like a cake and one part granted freedom by India. Musharraf ridicules India on the number of casualties it suffered in the Kargil conflict, which were 600 by India’s own admission. He says that the actual figure was nearly double that (p.98), but nowhere in the book discloses the actual casualties on the Pakistani side, even though he claims boastfully that the assertion that Pakistan had suffered many deaths is a myth.

Anyone reading the book is painfully reminded about the active role played by the military in establishing fundamentalist religious law in Pakistan. General Zia ul-Haq encouraged radical mullahs to take over the country, to preempt action from genuine political parties. His successors trained and funded the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, of course, with overt American support. He introduced lashing as a form of punishment as prescribed by Sharia, in which senior military officials witnessed the punishment having tea and snacks from an enclosure reserved for them. Musharraf writes of one incident in which he ordered tea and cakes to be taken away, in disgust. The army took over government at will. This was helped in no small measure by the politicians who were corrupt to the hilt. Democracy is a stillborn in Pakistan, in which the army allows a few years of democratic rule whenever they become tired of administration all by themselves. Even in the top brass of the army, bargaining and campaigning for tops posts prevails, as Musharraf himself, in all probability, inveigled himself on Nawaz Sharif, who was the then prime minister, to ask for the resignation of the army chief Jahangir Karamat any bypassing the seniority of the Chief of General Staff, to confer on himself the coveted post of army chief. As noted by the author himself, Karamat even refused to talk to him immediately after stepping down. Musharraf feigns ignorance at the reason for summons from the Prime Minister’s Office at night, which was to elevate him to the top army post! This was laughable due to its insincerity which was too plain and obvious. However, Pakistan’s army chiefs have a habit of biting the hands that feed them. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto made Zia ul-Haq the military chief bypassing many senior officers. A short time later, Haq usurped power and hanged Bhutto after a sham trial. Similarly Nawaz Sharif made Pervez Musharraf the army chief over the heads of many. Hardly a year later, Musharraf repaid the debt – by dethroning Nawaz Sharif and driving him to exile in Saudi Arabia. Such are the antecedents of a nation that possesses nuclear capability!

 Musharraf explains in detail the economic reform measures he had instituted to save the country from the brink of bankruptcy. The results are impressive, if the data is accurate and trustworthy. As CEO of the country, he had to face a referendum that confirmed him as the president of the nation. This was widely rigged and it is amusing to hear the author say ‘overenthusiastic administration officials and bureaucrats allowed people to vote more than once, and filled ballot papers themselves” (p.98). He even alleges that opposition parties stuffed ballot boxes in his favour, so as to provide evidence of malpractice!

The discussion on growth of terrorism and counter-terrorism initiatives is very informative. This presents a very serious point to ponder for India, as the author affirms that Muslims of south India are very active participants in Afghan terrorism (p.212). The author must have been very fond of crime stories, as seen in the quite large number of episodes described, where the terrorists were nabbed by intelligence agencies. This also proves that Pakistan’s security forces are also compromised to terrorist ideology as seen in the easy infiltration by extremist elements. While accepting the inevitable fact that terrorism needs to be stamped out, Musharraf declares that Muslims are drawn to militant ideology because of “revulsion at the sheer pathos of the Muslim condition, the political injustices, societal deprivation and alienation”. He also feels that for terrorism to vanish, injustices against Muslims are to be removed! This is a simplistic argument bordering on naiveté and retelling the terrorist creed in softer words. It assumes that Muslims of all countries are politically homogeneous and Muslims in Indonesia or Somalia are equally outraged against the supposed injustices in Palestine or Kashmir. All religions are more or less victims to these inequities in various scales, but why terrorists originate only among Muslims?

As can be seen in the above discussion, this review has been somewhat harsh on Musharraf, his book and Pakistan itself. But one thing must be conceded on his behalf. Apart from while addressing contentious issues, there is a raw frankness and energy in his style. Not at all hesitant to take up physical challenges, he has assimilated a dynamic approach to problem solving, which is refreshing. His insight on why Pakistan was created is illuminating, which “was built as a refuge and homeland for the Muslims of India to escape Hindu economic and political domination and social discrimination” (p.136). However, the author is not at all candid while discussing his army’s disastrous involvement in the Bangladesh crisis. Gruesome tales of rape, murder and pillage unleashed by Pakistani soldiers are not at all mentioned.

The book is written mainly with American readers in mind as can be guessed by the inordinate stress on the presence of democratic institutions and social accommodation in Pakistan. Imperial units like mile and feet are continuously used alongside metric units, as can be seen in books originating in the U.S. The author takes great pains to ‘prove’ to the English-speaking world that each one of his cabinet colleagues could speak fluent English. At the same time, he doesn’t show political foresight required of a politician. He asserts that Nawaz Sharif committed political suicide by trying to oust him by diverting the commercial jetliner he was travelling in, to India and hoping to crash the aircraft with an empty fuel tank. Sharif was ousted by the army and forced into exile in 1999. Writing in 2006, this was how the scenario looked like. But we now know that Sharif indeed made a comeback and a few years later, it was Musharraf’s turn to go into exile. The book is written in a simple, yet elegant language and a good index adds much value to it.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 3 Star