Title: A
Concise History of Sunnis and Shi’is
Author: John McHugo
Publisher: Saqi Books, 2017 (First)
ISBN: 9780863561634
Pages: 347
Islam appears deceptively homogeneous to non-Muslims.
The many sects and doctrinesthriving in it are not easily discernible to
outsiders, yet for their proponents they constitute all that's worth in life. Newspapers
trumpet about the Shia-Sunni divide and how it rends the fabric of entire
societies in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Both are followers of Prophet Muhammad and essentially
believe in the unity of God. How they separated and what drives them to diverge
ideologically is a profound question which this book answers to a substantial
amount. A simplistic narrative is taking hold in the West which envisages the
Sunnis and Shias as engaged in a perpetual state of religious war that has
lasted across centuries. Nothing can be further from the truth. The recent
spurt in sectarian violence is in fact caused more by political problems that
need a contemporary political solution rather than from ideology or dogma. An
analysis of the strife clearly shows that violence has grown only since the
year 1979 and shifted to top gear after 2003. Both these dates are significant
for the impact it made in Middle Eastern politics, and hence to the world as a
whole. The first is the establishment of a theocratic state in Iran dominated
by the Shia clergy while the second is the American occupation of Iraq in which
a Sunni autocrat was unseated and power handed over to Shia politicians who
represented their sect which is numerically superior in Iraq. This Shiarevival
in the political sphere ruffled the feathers of the Sunni Wahhabi hardliners in
Saudi Arabia. The conflicts in the Middle East are spawned by this political tussle
between two entrenched conservative ideologies. John McHugo is an international
lawyer with a solid background in Arabic and Islamic Studies from Oxford and
the American University in Cairo. He is an expert on Syria and the Middle East
and has written another book on a similar topic.
The sectarian violence in Islam began immediately
after the death of the Prophet. His family and his tribe took opposing
positions in the power struggle. While the family was represented by Ali ibn
Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, the other was led by Abu Bakr,
the Prophet’s father-in-law and leader of the Quraysh tribe to which all of
them belonged. A lack of political judgement and decisiveness was a character
flaw in Ali, who reluctantly acquiesced to the elevation of Abu Bakr,Umar and Uthmanas
caliphs to follow the path of the Prophet. The first serious violence among
Muslims was the killing of caliphUthman by a mob who besieged his home. It was
a time when the old rivalries between Mecca and Medina; the Muhajiroun(the
people who accompanied the Prophet in his exodus to Medina) and the Ansar(the
supporters of the Prophet who were natives of Medina); the early converts to
Islam and the newcomers and that between Qurayshis and non-Qurayshis were
boiling over. Ali finally succeeded Uthman, but his assassination had eroded
the legitimacy of his reign. He was always on a collision course with Mu’awiyabin
AbiSufyan, the governor of Greater Syria who stepped into the caliph’s shoes upon
the assassination of Ali. Ali's wife Fatimah was the only child of the Prophet
who had progeny and bore him two sons - Hasan and Hussein. They entered into a
deal with Mu’awiya that the latter would resume the caliphate to the sons of
Ali after his death. However, Hasan died before Mu’awiyadid and Hussein was
brutally murdered at the end of an unequal battle at Karbala upon the orders of
Yazid, the son of Mu’awiya. This event marked the rise of Shiism which
literally means the ‘Party of Ali’. The other main group, Sunnis, recognise the
legitimacy of the first threecaliphs and forms about 85 per cent of the total
Muslim population. The Shias are known for their gruesome accts of self-mortification
in the commemorative processions of Hussein's martyrdom.
After setting out the birth and original sources of
Shiism, McHugo proceeds to describe how the division consolidated itself and
became a scar on the body of Islamic society. Two divergent approaches emerged
during the first two centuries of Abbasid rule. A hierarchy of the teachings of
the religion became established, in which the sequence followed was the Prophet's
companions, then their followers and finally, the followers of the followers.
The people of these first three generations of Muslims were called ‘Righteous Ancestors’
(al-Salaf al-Salih). After the text of the Quran, the recollections attributed
to them constituted the tradition, or Sunna. The people who followed it are
called Sunnis. Shias looked to the other members of the Prophet’s family as the
source of guidance to his teachings. They ascribed special knowledge of the
true meaning of the religion to them. The Shias themselves split into separate
sub sects such as Twelvers, Ismailis, Zaydis and Druzes. The sharp
crystallization of the two sects came about in the Buyid period starting from
945 CE when the Abbasid caliphs came to be mere puppets at the hands of the Buyids.
The authority of the caliphs to interpret Sharia law declined. It came about
that true Islam could be practiced wherever a Muslim ruler kept a court with a
staff of religious scholars. There was – and still is – no central teaching
authority in Sunni Islam. Shias meanwhile put faith in an imam who is a
divinely inspired descendant of the Prophet. Scholars take a lesser position in
Shiism.
The book then turns to the nineteenth century in
which a Shia-Sunni synthesis was attempted by religious scholars. By this time,
the leading Muslim empires of the Ottomans and Safavid/Iranians had run out of
steam in the face of shocking defeats at the hands of European powers. The rest
of Islamic history hinges on the duel between Western political ideas and Islamism
as a way to administer a country. Adherents of the Western system demanded
democracy, elections, personal liberty, freedom of expression and rule of law
as the fundamentals without which a country cannot stand on its legs. The
worshippers of Islamism view Islam not only as a religion but a political
philosophy as well, which controls all aspects of a person's life and demands
absolute submission from him or her. The organisations are many such as the Jama’at
Islami, Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda or ISIS, but the ultimate goal
of all of them are the same – absolute power over the society in which no
opposition is tolerated and people of other religions are firmly kept down as
second class citizens. The author quotes a social commentator who argues that
Islamism has already lost the fight and 9/11 was a desperate act by a side who
knew that they have lost the game. The uprising in 2011, called Arab Spring,
disseminated its appeal across all sects and we saw the people demanding
Western-style rights from their dictatorial overlords.
The Islamic world is now boiling over with
violence, but this book lays the blame squarely at the doors of the Islamic Revolution
of Iran in 1979. The unexpected rise of the Shia crescent in Iran, post-2003
Iraq, Syria and Yemen stung the Wahhabi hardliners in Saudi Arabia to take
action. If we follow this logic, it must be assumed that the last word is yet
to be pronounced. The current sanctions imposed on Iran by the US are just
another move on the chequered board. The book makes a special note on ibn Abd
al-Wahhab who founded the theological creed Wahhabism and comments on the eerie
similarity of his teachings with that of Luther and Calvin, who were the
reformist leaders of catholic Christianity. He then warns that in light of the fierce
wars fought in Europe in the stride of the reformers, those who wants reformation
in Islam should be careful what they wish for.
The book is impressive to read, but two huge
factual errors seen in it discount its credibility to a great extent. It seems
that the author is unacquainted with Indian history, but it does not hold him
back from putting up grand schemes of Shia-Sunni interactions in the
subcontinent. He claims that the Delhi sultanate was overthrown by Babur in
1398 (p.171). This is wrong. It was Timur who invaded in that year and the
Delhi sultanate could weather over the storm. Babur came to India precisely 128
years later. Then again, the author states that Jahangir constructed Taj Mahal
as the mausoleum for his beloved Shia wife Noor Jahan (p.173). Noor Jahan was a
Shia, but isn't it common knowledge that it was Shah Jahan who built the Taj in
memory of his wife Mumtaz Mahal who died in childbirth? What accuracy can you
hope to observe from a scholar of Islamic history who can't even get the story
of the Taj right?
The book is recommended.
Rating:
3 Star
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