The Dawn of Science

Title: The Dawn of Science – Glimpses From History for the Curious Mind

Author: Thanu Padmanabhan, Vasanthi Padmanabhan

Publisher: Springer, 2019 (First)

ISBN: 9783030259259

Pages: 286

Products bestowed by science and technology pervades every wakeful moment of humanity. In fact, they provide safety and comfort to us even when we are asleep. Today's society cannot live without electricity and its associated products and services and it is just taken for granted. But we have been fortunate to avail these facilities for only a very short fraction of time mankind was on the earth. This should make us curious to know how science developed over the centuries and the glorious milestones it had passed on in its onward march. This book is a great effort by a husband and wife team to ‘share the excitement they felt about the historical development of scientific ideas with the like-minded, curious, educated lay public’. The excellent narration is split into 24 chapters from antiquity to the seventeenth century, more particularly to Newton's contributions to physics and Lavoisier’s to chemistry which is identified as the dawn of science. Thanu Padmanabhan is an Indian theoretical physicist and cosmologist whose research spans a wide variety of topics. He has published nearly 300 papers and reviews in international journals and ten books in these areas. He is currently a Distinguished Professor at the IUCAA in Pune, India. Vasanthi Padmanabhan is his wife and she is a professor of civil engineering.

The book puts great stress on the origin and development of science in the Middle East. The earliest achievement of humanity with great science and technological skill is the Egyptian pyramids built around 2500 BCE. Such technical skill could not have come about without understanding the basics of science. All ancient civilizations claim an offshoot of science within their culture, yet Thales of Miletus who lived in the fourth century BCE spelt out the necessity of proof and developed a step-by-step logic leading to conclusions from given premises. This was the birth of the scientific method. Other civilizations like the Egyptians, Babylonians, Indians and Chinese did not bother for logical proof. What is truly remarkable is the contribution of Euclid to geometry. His thirteen-volume masterpiece called ‘Elements’ serve as a textbook to students even now. Euclid did not create the content contained in it which was developed by other great thinkers. He may not be a first-rate mathematician, but was definitely a first-rate teacher who could write excellent textbooks. The first spark of rational thinking occurred with Hippocrates who realised and emphasized that diseases arise due to natural causes and not because of divine wrath.

Most historians of science jump to Renaissance Italy after their treatment of Greek thinkers. This approach is lopsided as it does not show the path through which Greek knowledge reached mediaeval Europe. Early Christian emperors shunned Greek scholarship as evidenced by Justinian’s closure of Plato's Academy which is traditionally thought to mark the beginning of Dark Ages. It was the Arabs who kept the candle of science glowing amid the deep gloom in which Europe was then immersed. The authors provide a detailed description of the Arab thinkers who contributed greatly to science by translating the Greek texts to Arabic and enhancing on it. When the crusading Europeans came into contact with them, they translated it to Latin and used to usher in the Renaissance. The movable printing process developed around 1430 by Johannes Gutenberg exerted more influence on the scientific revolution than all the scholarly expositions of several mediaeval scientists put together.

It is common for authors to highlight the persecution of Galileo at the hands of the Church. The usual emphasis is on the superstitious yet extremely powerful clergy forcing a right thinking, simple scientist to recant his findings upon pain of death. This stereotype is completely demolished in this book. The authors argue that while it is usual to universally condemn the charge for persecuting science, a careful study of historical facts indicates that Galileo personally played a great part in aggravating the situation. Galileo acted and wrote in a way that made him several enemies, some of them quite powerful and influential. The personality of Galileo and also the antagonism of his scientific colleagues were as instrumental in bringing about his conflict with the Church as the Church itself (p.156).

Many Indian authors generally fall in the trap of forwarding magnificent but unsubstantiated claims on the development of science in ancient India. There are scholars who brag about knowledge of air travel and even nuclear weapons to have existed among our ancestors. Here, the authors keep a steady, scientific route while digging into the Indian legacy in science. It might sadden many of us, but apart from some mathematical concepts such as the invention of zero in a place value notation system, the value of Pi correct to four decimal places and some rudiments of calculus, our country has not produced that many discoveries. But the concept of zero is so powerful in mathematics that without it, the discipline’s development would have been stunted. This book also catalogues new findings about the birth of calculus in Kerala, India in the fourteenth century CE. There existed an extraordinary lineage of mathematicians of which Madhava (1350–1420 CE) developed many basic ideas of calculus. The infinite series for the sine, cosine and arctan as well as rudiments of integration are attributed to him. Information on this branch of Kerala mathematics was discovered by Charles M Whish in 1834.

The book is very informatively structured. Historic and geographic position indicators are provided at the end of each chapter enabling the readers to view the region on a map where the development had taken place and the timeline interspersed with other historical events. Lots of pictures are included, but their captions are long and often a repeat of the relevant area of the main text. Some very interesting anecdotes and titbits are given in boxes that can be read independent of the main narrative.

The book is strongly recommended.

Rating: 4 Star

Lords of the Desert

Title: Lords of the Desert – Britain’s Struggle with America to Dominate the Middle East

Author: James Barr

Publisher: Simon & Schuster, 2018 (First)

ISBN: 9781471174032

Pages: 401

The US and the UK are bosom friends in everything from culture and commerce to international policy. What pervades this all-weather friendship is the unquestioned dominance of the US in every sphere of activity you can think of. But this was not always like this. There was a time when Britain enjoyed its metropolis status over the destiny of a vast empire in which the sun never set and ruled the waves of all oceans on the planet. The US never had a colonialist hinterland though the nation itself was almost a continent on its own size. The Second World War changed the imperialist status quo. Though Britain and her Allies prevailed over their Axis enemies, the victory was a Pyrrhic one. The economic backbone of the empire was broken and its compulsion to cede independence to the colonies severely curtailed British prospects of ruling the world again. The US stepped in as a replacement to Britain, and turned out to be much more powerful in a different role. During the transition period, the British and the Americans struggled for supremacy in the Middle East, which contained the most promising commodity of the twentieth century – oil. From 1942, until Britain’s exit from the Gulf was completed in 1971, the two countries were invariably competitors in the Middle East and often outright rivals. The two issues of oil and Israel always stood ominously behind the violence in the region. This book is the story of how the Americans rose to prominence while Britain’s star was gradually eclipsed. James Barr is a British author of a number of historical works on the Middle East and is currently a visiting fellow at King’s College London.

Barr examines the economic perspective which pitted both countries against each other. The war effort absorbed sixty per cent of the industrial output in the US. After the World War, the demand would fall away leading to mass unemployment. Increase in exports was the only solution to tide over the crisis but this would place the Americans on a collision course with the British because a successful American export drive in the Middle East would be detrimental to British interests, which in the meanwhile had flooded the markets with British products under the guise of war-time shipping restrictions. Britain almost went bankrupt at the end of the war, resorting to food-rationing to feed its population. Liberal economic aid poured out of the US, but each incoming dollar constrained Britain’s independent maneuverability against conflicting American interests.

Israel was a turning point in Middle East history. Right after the defeat of Turkey in World War I, Zionists had identified Palestine as the place to house the Jewish diaspora. With Nazi persecution of Jews, inward migration reached such a pitch as to alarm the Arabs. Understandably, the Arabs opposed further migration, but their opposition had only a religious basis engendered by notions of jihad. Jews exerted an organized and carefully calculated influence in US politics. Under fire from the Zionists for failing to do more for Jewish refugees, Roosevelt tried to court the Jewish vote during the presidential campaign of 1944. He promised to bring about the establishment of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. This opened the floodgates of illegal migration to Palestine. Some Jewish organisations even engaged in terrorism, targeting British troops and officials who oversaw the Mandate there. Fundraising continued unabated in the US and the Administration was reluctant to clamp down on them, fearing Jewish backlash in the ballot box. Britain left Palestine on 14 May 1948 and Arab-Israeli war broke out the next day. A Jewish state was declared and Truman promptly recognized it. The book depicts Britain as a staunch opponent of the Jews who in turn directed their physical violence against it. People often accuse the US for aligning their foreign policy in line with their business interests. But in the case of Israel, supporting them cost the US dear in terms of Arab goodwill, but still they continue to steadfastly support them against all odds.

The author accurately analyses the efforts to control the flow of oil to its western markets. Iran and Iraq were traditionally under the control of Britain while Saudi Arabian oil was managed by the US. No effort, howsoever unsavory, was spared to ensure the flow of oil. Bribes were used universally across the region. Aramco laid an oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Lebanon’s Mediterranean coast at great peril. It freely bribed Syria’s politicians for transit rights. When that proved insufficient, they organized a military coup to bring down a non-pliable civilian government. When Iranian premier Mossadegh nationalized the British-owned oil company, he too was brought down. Taking his cue, Egypt’s Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Britain attacked Egypt but had to withdraw ignominiously when the US opposed the move in a surprising turn of events. During this time, they dramatically increased Saudi oil production and provided its king vast wealth. The windfall from oil often astonished the British as well. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s concession in Iran was termed by Churchill as a ‘prize from fairy land far beyond our brightest hopes’. They massaged the profit figures of the enterprise to cut down on the dividends payable to the Arabs.

A noted aspect of American foreign policy is its stated desire to spread the idea of democracy around the world. Usually, this turned out to be nothing more than rhetoric and an attempt to make the right noises to please its clients at home and abroad. The US persuaded Britain to grant more autonomy and freedom to India but didn’t follow through with coercive measures when it became evident that they had no immediate plans to do so during the war. In the 1950s, this policy underwent a subtle shift in the Middle East. Abandoning their quest for democracy, they actively hunted for competent leaders who were somewhat favourably disposed to the West. With it went the hopes of democracy transforming the Arab states.

The Middle East is dominated by the Arabic language which is spoken in an unbroken chain from Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east. Apart from faint spattering of Christians, the people are overwhelmingly Muslim. In the face of these obvious uniting factors, the readers of this book would be astonished at the total absence of cohesion among the people and the very high levels of mutual distrust and suspicion. The monarchs are jealous of each other’s ambitions while demagogues orchestrate to uproot other elected leaders and also monarchs. Arab nationalism appears to be so fractured and fragile that it never rises above tribal aspirations and prejudices. The Hashemites cashed in on the rout of Ottomans while the Saudis displaced them from Arabia proper. The Hashemites further subdivided into Jordanian and Iraqi branches and then tried to outwit the other. Gamal Abdel Nasser rose up as a promising leader who could unify the Middle East. But he was not above resorting to underhand deals and military interventions in other countries. Anyhow, with Egypt’s miserable defeat at the hands of Israelis in the 1967 war sealed his fate. The Arab world continues to be divided even now.

The book is very informative and pleasingly readable. The narrative is witty with lots of side comments that freshen up the reader. In these 340 pages, Barr condenses the entire story of the Middle East for a quarter century. Obviously, he has used much declassified documents which present some shocking details. King Hussein of Jordan is claimed to have received considerable sums of money from the CIA every month as part of their effort to keep the local rulers in good humour.

The book is strongly recommended.

Rating: 4 Star

The Bomb

Title: The Bomb – Presidents, Generals and the Secret History of Nuclear War

Author: Fred Kaplan

Publisher: Simon & Schuster, 2020 (First)

ISBN: 9781982107291

Pages: 372

Opening of the nuclear age with the ruthless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought in a new dimension in warfare. The unacceptable level of devastation in infrastructure and human lives at first presented a scenario to presidents and generals that immensely favoured those who possessed the weapons. However, the nuclear gap between the US and its arch enemy, the Soviet Union, closed in just one decade thanks in most part to espionage by politically motivated scientists and technicians who worked in the American nuclear effort. With Russia acquiring the nuclear capability, stalemate returned in international policy. Both sides tried hard to be one step ahead of their rival by devising grand plans for a nuclear first strike which would cripple the enemy’s atomic stockpile. The other side then matched the challenge by diversifying its weapon launch capacity to land, undersea and air. While all this was going on, the nuclear weapons were multiplying. Any skirmish between the two superpowers or between their proxies quickened the pulse of the world as each side boasted of an arsenal that had the potential to destroy the planet many times over. With the demise of communism and collapse of the Soviet Union, the nuclear standoff cooled considerably and the number of weapons greatly reduced. But with the rise of rogue states like Pakistan and North Korea attaining nuclear capability and a resurgent Russia under Putin, they once again begin to assume greater significance. This book is a snapshot of how American politicians and military men handled them for seven decades after World War II. Fred Kaplan is an American author and journalist who has six books to his credit and handles a weekly column ‘War Stories’ for the ‘Slate’ magazine.

Kaplan presents the calm confidence of the US establishment immediately after the world war when Russia did not possess nuclear weapons. This enabled them to casually examine the stakes if nuclear weapons were launched in response to conventional warfare such as in Korea. But the situation didn't stay stagnant for long. The US resolve was tested when Khrushchev tried to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. The US posture was belligerent but Kaplan provides details from classified documents that reveal its climb down. President Kennedy reached a secret deal with his Soviet counterpart to dismantle American missiles deployed in Turkey in response to Soviet withdrawal of its own weapons from Cuba.

The unquestioned premise of Cold War nuclear policy was that deterrence required persuading the Soviets that the American president would use nuclear weapons first, in response to aggression against it or its allies in Europe or elsewhere. The NATO member states basked under the nuclear umbrella unfolded by the US. This was essentially an American guarantee to launch nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe even by conventional means. This made the nuclear weapons the centrepiece of Trans-Atlantic security. But the actual fact was that there was no scenario in which using nuclear weapons would give the US or any country an advantage because of the extreme damage caused by a nuclear strike. However tightly they guarded their skies, it was still possible that many of the enemy’s nuclear warheads would hit the homeland. This was the conclusion that every president of the nuclear age and most high level political officials had reached. Yet those presidents and officials also realised that they had to act as if they would use nuclear weapons or else their threats might not be credible in a crisis. On the one hand they wanted the Soviets to think these things would actually be used to ensure deterrence. On the other, they did not want to make a weapon too easy or tempting to use if war broke out. 

The book also points out efforts to stem the tide of brinkmanship. Way back in 1963 itself, the US, USSR and UK signed a treaty outlawing tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under the ocean or in outer space. Contrary to the popular image they had cultivated, we see many truculent presidents adopting a very sane outlook on nuclear issues. Reagan entered the White House with an entourage bent not merely on deterring and containing the Soviet Union but on weakening and rolling back its empire. But once he was assured of the earnestness of Gorbachev, he scaled down his plans and offered drastic cuts in the arsenal. The Soviet Empire was in tatters at the time. Gorbachev realised that the Soviet Union was in shambles, its ideology moribund and its economy dysfunctional. Its military budget consumed nearly all of the government’s resources.

People would normally presume that nuclear weapons being highly destructive, its uses and deployment are most meticulously planned. Kaplan provides stunning details of sloppy preparedness. Each arm of the US military such as the Army, Navy and Air Force fixed their targets in isolation and two targets which may physically be very near so as to suffer lethal damage as the result of a nuclear strike on the other, were given no attention to the offensive redundancy. In 1991, a critical review to weed out redundancy and an imaginative selection of targets was undertaken. As a result, the requirement of nuclear weapons came down from 12,000 to 5,888. This reduction stemmed not from an arms control treaty or relaxation of international tensions, but rather from a purely technical, deep dive analysis of how many weapons US policy required. We see that at the height of the nuclear standoff, the city of Moscow was targeted by 689 nuclear weapons, many releasing more than a megaton of explosive power. By comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had the power of only fifteen kilotons.

The book is easy to read, but too many acronyms and too many characters from the US bureaucracy prove to be a spoilsport. After a while, readers lose track of who’s who with the long line of secretaries, deputy and deputy assistant secretaries dancing before their eyes in the text. The book presents only the American perspective. It includes many references that express doubt on the sanity of decisions taken by the current President, Donald Trump.

The book is recommended.

Rating: 3 Star