Fat’h al-Mubin

Title: Fat’h al-Mubin

Author: Qadi Muhammad

Publisher: Other Books, 2015 (First published 1576)

ISBN: 9789380081175

Pages: 106

 

With the forceful Portuguese entry into the spice trade along Malabar coast in the sixteenth century, the age-old traditions and business relationships underwent a sea change. The newcomers were not content to be one among the players. Aiming to dominate the spice trade and navigation in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese displaced the Arabs by military means. This set in motion a long series of attacks between Muslims and the Portuguese. Muslim intellectuals in Kerala recorded the events as a historical narrative. Notable among these was Sheikh Zainuddin Makhdum’s Tuhfat al-Mujahideen (Gift to the holy warriors) which was reviewed earlier. The next in line is Fat’h al-Mubin (A clear victory). Both these texts were originally written in Arabic. They present the Muslim side of the story in contrast to what we have from Portuguese archives. This narrative centres on the siege and eventual destruction of the Portuguese fort at Chaliyam in 1569. The attack on the fort was a part of the war effort that was orchestrated with help and coordination from Deccan sultanates of Bijapur and Berar. However, as the battleground heated up, the Deccan sultans slunk away from the accord and withdrew. Finally, the Zamorin – the traditional king of Calicut – accepted the responsibility on his shoulders. The Zamorin is the real hero of this history because of his support for the Muslim cause. This book effectively conveys the outrage which Malayali Muslims felt about the aggression of the Portuguese. The author Muhammad ibn Qadi Abdul Aziz was the Muslim civil judge of Calicut and the book was written around the year 1576.

 

Since the Zamorin is the hero of the tale, the author narrates legends about his dynasty that is extolled as without parallel. A story about the first Zamorin who had converted to Islam is also given. This is obviously the result of confusion with the legend of Cheraman Perumal, the last hereditary emperor of Kerala who distributed all land to his vassals. The first Zamorin got only a broken sword from him as he was very much delayed in appearing before his overlord. However, that Zamorin rose to the pinnacle with his military prowess. Islamic lore suggests that Perumal then accepted Islam, abdicated and went to Mecca. Another interesting tale on the origin of Zamorin’s clan links them to Moses or Prophet Musa, as the Muslims call him. The anglicized name Zamorin is rendered from the Malayalam title Samoothiri or Samoori. In the Quran, Sameri was the follower of Moses who misguided people exhorting them to worship the idol of the calf he made. Zamorin’s worship of the cow as a sacred symbol of Hinduism and the resemblance of his similarly sounding name prompted some people to connect his ancestry to Egypt and Moses.

 

The poetic tradition of medieval Kerala Muslims becomes quite evident in the author’s remark that he intends to stick to it and that rendition of prose into poetry is like changing silver to gold. It should be remembered that this comes at a time when alchemy was still a mysterious but respectable profession. Besides, Qadi Muhammad is also the author of Muhyuddin Mala, a garland of poetic honorifics being sung in Malabar in praise of Sufi saint Sheikh Muhyuddin Abdul Qadeer Jilani. The author was a polyglot and trained in many areas of learning. The book narrates the events right from the arrival of the Portuguese and till the capture of Chaliyam fort. The earlier part of the story is told without reference to any dates and serves only as background information to the events that led to the siege of the fort.

 

The book glorifies the Zamorin to the hilt because he sided with the Muslims. His ships are said to be sailing on the seas like the Persian horses do over vast plains. The hyperbole extends to his rule, of which justice and moderation were the significant features. He never confiscated anybody’s property except in case of crime nor does he teases anybody with injustice. He did not capture countries of those beneath him, even if they disobeyed. He was so kind-hearted that in such cases, he was satisfied by extracting tribute from such vassals. He was also said to be wise, statesmanlike, brave, patient, tolerant and spent all that he received as taxes and penalties on charities and feeding the poor. Since the Zamorin was fighting against infidels in spite of his own disbelief, the author reminds Muslims that it was incumbent on them that such a one should be prayed for like a Muslim sultan. The Zamorin was also shrewd in making appeals to Muslim communal sensibilities. He appointed a Quran reciter to encourage people besieging the fort. The author argues that death of a single Muslim soldier was a greater affliction to the Zamorin than the death of ten infidels. The author’s intolerance to non-Muslims is typical of Islamic thinkers anywhere, anytime. After the Chaliyam fort was demolished, he gave some portions of it as building material to reconstruct the Mishkal Masjid which was earlier destroyed by the Portuguese. The demolition of the fort was a long drawn-out process that lasted a year. In the end, it was leveled to the ground and the fort was said to have become a dream. At that instant, Adil Shah and Nizam Shah of Deccan switched sides and made peace with the Portuguese without any obvious justification palatable to his co-religionists in Kerala.

 

The author also provides relevant details on the political rivalries between the major powers of the era. To counter the Portuguese might, Muslim kings entered into a naval alliance that included the Ottoman sultan of Turkey, Mameluke sultan of Egypt and the sultan of Cambay (Gujarat). Even with this alliance in place to bolster their effort, they could not reach Calicut. The author claims poor strategy and bribery as the real reasons for this failure. In Kerala, the Zamorin treated other native rulers with contempt. They were repeatedly humiliated by forcing to seek permission even for such mundane tasks such as re-tiling the roof of their residences. Thus, they were looking for an opportunity to ditch their suzerain by making treaties with the Portuguese who was the enemy of the Zamorin. The rulers of Kochi and Kannur welcomed them with open arms. Another neighbour of the Zamorin, the Vettath Raja of Tanur, is reported to have converted to Christianity out of his enmity to the Zamorin. We can also have a glimpse on the total monopoly of the Portuguese on the spice trade of Malabar. Pepper and ginger were the staple commodities that were entirely handled by them. They left only such unwanted items such as coconuts for other traders. The author laments that whoever wanted a corn of pepper for making soup obtained it only in powdered form and packed in a piece of cloth. The Portuguese seems to have controlled retail trade too.

 

The book is a very short one, in 70 pages, containing 537 couplets in all. The translation has wiped away all poetic worth. The Arabic original is also given in the book. There are clarificatory notes at the bottom of most pages. The dates and years are rarely mentioned in the work and when it is disclosed, it is in Hejira calendar system. The book contains a foreword by Stephen Dale, an eminent historian known for his studies on eastern Islamic world and Kerala Muslims.

 

The book is recommended.

Rating: 3 Star

 

Maritime Trade of the Malabar Coast and the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century

Title: Maritime Trade of the Malabar Coast and the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century
Author: K S Mathew
Publisher: Manohar Publishers, 2016 (First published 1983)
ISBN: 9789350980118
Pages: 432

Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the sea route to India was a corollary to the age of exploration and grand voyages carried out from the Iberian Peninsula. Earlier, Indian spices had reached Europe through the markets of Alexandria, Beirut and Istanbul and then on to Venice and Genoa on the Italian coast. The Arab Muslims had monopoly of the trade and they had Europe in the palm of their hand. The Portuguese sought to displace the Arabs from the trade altogether by imposing monopoly on cargo procurement in Malabar and its transportation to Europe. As the material then directly reached Lisbon, European merchants abandoned Venice and flocked to Portugal. However, Portugal’s highhanded measures invited resistance from Muslim traders and local Indian rulers. Thus the sixteenth century was a crucial period in world history as the point of colonialism’s ascent. This book is based on a thorough study of Portuguese archives in Lisbon. After India had forcibly annexed the Portuguese enclave of Goa in 1961, diplomatic relations were cut between the two countries. Thus Indian scholars couldn’t lay hands on the documents preserved in the archival repositories of Portugal till 1976. The situation became more relaxed thereafter and this author was one of the first scholars who utilized the open window of opportunity. K S Mathew was a professor of history at the central universities of Hyderabad and Pondicherry. He was also a visiting fellow/professor at many universities in Europe and North America. He had published 23 books besides many research articles. This book was first published in 1983.

With his knowledge of the Portuguese language, Mathew reconstructs the basics of Malabar – Portuguese trade with reference to primary sources in some detail. The political, social and commercial equations have been taken into consideration. The mechanism of cargo movement is analysed both through land and sea. They tried blockade of the movement of spices through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf in order to become the sole dealers of the cargo precious in Europe. On the land side they entered into contracts with agents to procure spices, of which pepper and ginger were the major crops of export from Malabar. The economic backwardness of Kerala at that time is plainly visible in the exchange of material. In return for the spices, Malabar wanted only gold, silver and copper. Items of consumption in Europe were not popular in Malabar. This trade imbalance and overdependence on bullion in buying spices created grave difficulties. Sometimes, they resorted to obtain spices on credit, with the local ruler acting as their surety.

The author makes a deliberate effort to paint the Portuguese in a beneficial light by either suppressing some of the heinous atrocities they committed or attempting to make it lighter. The book just glosses over the longstanding feud between the Portuguese and Muslim traders and sailors of Malabar. In fact, I had expected to get to know some facts about Kunjali Marakkars, the naval chiefs of the Zamorin, from this book but was entirely disappointed by its lack of coverage of this topic. The Muslim merchants of Calicut obstructed the supply of pepper to the Portuguese whose entry was threatening their own monopoly. Clashes took place between the two, but Mathew exonerates the Portuguese. A ship belonging to Mammali Marakkar, a Muslim trader of Kochi, was going to Mocha with elephants from Ceylon. The author accuses the Zamorin of having persuaded the Portuguese to capture the ship by falsely claiming that it carried pepper. He wanted to appropriate the elephants for his own use. In retaliation to this act, Muslims attacked the factory at Calicut, killed the factor Aires Correa along with 50 other Portuguese. The factory was also razed to the ground. Gama returned next year to extract vengeance by bombarding the town. Several people were killed and Gama sent a boat carrying the severed head and limbs of the people to the Zamorin along with a note stating that these were the merchandise in which he was going to deal. The author claims that Kunjali Marakkar indulged in piracy, which turned the Portuguese against him. The horrifying massacre of Hajj pilgrims returning from Mecca along the Malabar coast and consequent plunder of the ship is not even mentioned.

When the first Portuguese sailor landed at Calicut in 1498, he was met by a Tunisian merchant who had arrived there to buy pepper. When he enquired what brought them there, Gama’s men replied that they came in search of ‘Christians and spices’. There was a strong inclination to proselytisation among them and we read of instances when the Portuguese trying unsuccessfully to convert the nobles and ruler of Kochi. But the author tries to paint a secular sheen to the entire episode by projecting Venetian rivalry and cooperation with Muslim intermediaries in collecting cargo. With Lisbon’s entry into the European spice trade, Venice was totally eclipsed and they sometimes could not even procure cargo in the Middle East. So they helped and fought alongside the Egyptian Mameluk sultans against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean even though they were Christians. Mathew uses this economic fighting point to claim that the Portuguese were not keen in propagation of the Christian faith and the annihilation of Islam (p.100). Similarly, the cooperation with Muslim traders is trumpeted as a case of how the Portuguese ‘having to throw their lot with the Muslims and the crusade joining hands with the jihad’ in the matter of trade (p.156).

The book includes extensive statistics on commodities imported and exported from Malabar which compiles port-wise details of total weight and value. The financial arrangements of the trade also find due representation in the book. As the scope for barter trade was rather slim, they had to exchange gold, silver or copper for purchasing spices. This fiscal need forced the Portuguese king to invite merchants and bankers from other European countries such as Germany and Italy to finance and also to participate in the trade. The Venetians swallowed their pride and established links with Lisbon to carry on trade to interior Europe. Judging from the price of pepper at various markets, readers get an idea of the immense profit the Portuguese made. They bought pepper at the rate of 3 ducats per quintal (of 52 kg) from Kochi. The same commodity cost 15 ducats at Alexandria and 45 ducats when it reached Venice. At Lisbon, this was sold for 22 ducats, thereby giving a solid financial advantage. The 3 ducats price agreed at Kochi in 1503 remained the same till 1585. When quality of the cargo fell as the agents adulterated the stock on account of rock-bottom prices, slight increases were granted.

The book also sheds light on the immense scale of ecclesiastical support to maintain Portuguese control on heathens and regions of great commercial potential. For nearly a century starting from 1454, many Popes proclaimed papal bulls to allocate new jurisdictions or ratify the actions of the Portuguese. In the bull named Romanus Pontifex, Pope Nicholas V highly commended the possibility of preaching the name of Christ to unbelievers if the efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator to find a sea route to India would finally bear fruit. This edict permitted them to invade, conquer and appropriate territories and kingdoms and reduce them to perpetual slavery (p.270). Moral considerations always came last in the scheme of medieval religious leaders. Piracy was an accepted practice for all Europe. The Portuguese sometimes plundered even those ships that had obtained passes (cartaz) from them for safe conduct. The booty from pirate raids was expected and planned to offset a portion of the operating cost of the maritime venture. It provided for payment of a part of the salary of officials and soldiers, expenses of the factories, purchase of commodities and also for Portuguese weddings in India. The Portuguese king instructed Viceroy Francisco de Almeida to exploit this source to the maximum. Slaves were also a portion of the booty. Slaves from captured vessels were taken to Portugal or employed in galleys.

This book is written from a purely European point of view, based on archival material in Lisbon. It does not name the Zamorin or other local rulers. Only the designations such as ‘ruler of Kochi’ are used while describing their involvement in a battle or concluding a treaty. Some of the content is duplicated in other chapters. For example, the general survey of history narrates some events, which is repeated in the chapter on diplomacy. A lot of tables and quantity of cargo transported to Portugal is included throughout the text. This book also sports an impressive bibliography. However, the readability is very limited owing to the extensive data on merchandise quoted frequently in the narrative.

The book is recommended.

Rating: 2 Star

The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947

Title: The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917-1947

Author: Ian Copland

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 1999 (First)

ISBN: 9788175960640

Pages: 302

 

V P Menon, an enterprising official in the British-Indian administration rose to everlasting fame as the linchpin of the Herculean task of annexation of the native kingdoms to the nascent dominion of India. About 565-odd states were thus made to accede to India, making it a continuous political entity for the first time in history. We now know about the personal vanities and political aspirations of these princes from a nationalistic perspective which usually put them as roadblocks to national integration. It is time to get a view from the British side that saw the nationalists and princes as two sides of the same coin. The maharajas have been maligned and marginalized by professional historians and this book is an attempt to put the record straight. The native states comprised two-fifths of the land area and a third of the population. This book handles the three decades from 1917 to 1947 and can be conceptually separated into three periods. In the first period, the princes realised the folly of remaining as individuals and became part of the Chamber of Princes to collectively bargain with the British. In the second, this chamber actively participated in the negotiations for an all-India federation of states as a first step to dominion status. The final period shows the fundamentally altered system of things after the Second World War and how the native states had to accede to the successor states one by one. Ian Copland is an associate professor of history at Monash University, Australia and is the author of several books on imperialism and colonialism.

 

Copland provides a clear picture of how the Indian states came to rest under the colonial empire’s wings without much fuss. Earlier, the British used to annex the states under one pretext or another. But after the 1857 Rebellion – in which most states remained friendly with the British – the colonial masters began to appreciate the element of stability these princes provided and stopped the practice of annexation. Thereafter, they remained as the paramount power and very gradually chipped away the powers of sovereignty that originally rested with the princes. Between 1878 and 1886, most states were compelled to relinquish control over their post and telegraph networks. In 1879, states were prohibited from exporting salt manufactured in their territories. From 1877, states were deprived of civil and criminal jurisdiction over railways passing through their land. British-Indian currency became legal tender in all states throughout the subcontinent and most states signed away their right to mint coinage. After 1879, freedom to import weapons for state police forces was steadily curtailed. The princes needed permission from the colonial authority for employing foreigners or making foreign travel themselves.

 

After Curzon’s exit as viceroy, the British initiated an effort to bring in constitutional reforms designed to ensure native participation in the administration of India. More administrative freedom was granted to the states in a policy of laissez faire. It is to be clarified here that states referred to native kingdoms and provinces mean the regions directly ruled by the British. The rulers had extended great help in the imperial war effort during the First World War in the form of men, materials and monetary resources. Consequently, the Montagu Declaration of 1917 envisaged exclusive consultation with princes on administrative reforms. The rulers of middling states like Bikaner, Alwar, Patiala and Nawanagar formed a committee to liaise with the British while larger states like Hyderabad and Mysore kept a safe distance. A 120-seat Chamber of Princes (COP) was set up as part of the reform package to advise the viceroy on all political questions relevant to the states. However, its effectiveness was rather limited as it was dominated by middle-sized, mainly Rajput rulers whose states were situated within relatively easy travelling distance by motor car from Delhi, who were fluent in English and who had acquired political skills by attending wartime Chiefs’ conferences.

 

Contrary to popular perception, not all of the rulers were against the nationhood of India or the growth of nationalism. Officials performing as diwans sometimes encouraged their rulers to show a national bias. Kailash Haksar and K M Panikkar, Diwans of Gwalior and Bikaner respectively, are notable here. Princes made parleys with Congress leaders prior to the Round Table Conferences (RTC) convened to chalk out plans for constitutional reforms. But Congress ruled itself out of the equation by deciding to withdraw from the constitutional process and commence a campaign of civil disobedience. It is an unfortunate chapter in Indian history that Congress recused itself out of two RTCs demanding the privilege of sole representation of the Indian people. The princes participated in all three RTCs. The Chamber (COP) was also riven with bickering over joining an all-India federation. They proposed a 250-seated upper house for the new central legislature. This was the forerunner of the current Rajya Sabha. Enactment of the Government of India Act in 1935 paved the way for a national federation, but the federation was to come into being only if a majority of the states had signified their adherence to it by acceding. Just when the discussions heated up, Congress reversed its policy of non-interference in native states at its session held at Haripura in 1938 under pressure from the socialist clique in the party. Satyagrahas of local subjects with outside help were staged. States were quickly destabilized, and the rulers were saved only with British support, but they could not forget how close they had come to catastrophe. Reluctance to join the federation intensified as a result. Exactly at this moment, the Second World War broke out and all reforms were relegated to cold storage.

 

This book displays how critically Indian independence was linked to the 1945 general elections in Britain that returned a Labour government under Clement Attlee and had practically nothing to credit Congress’ failed Quit India initiative of 1942. This put the rulers also under great hardship. The post-war Labour government, unlike its predecessor, had few inhibiting personal ties with the Indian princes. They were not ideologically well disposed to the perpetuation of monarchies. The princes thought that the treaties they had signed with the British long ago would compel their masters to guarantee the survival of native states. But these were made more than a century before and had long ceased to be appropriate to the conditions of the modern world. Practically, Attlee left the states to their own devices. The rising Pakistan demand had cast its dark shadow on the unity among the princes too. The CoP split in April 1947 and contrary to the Nawab of Bhopal’s – the Chancellor of the Chamber – entreaties, several member states joined India’s constituent assembly on their own discretion. From this moment onwards, the Chamber stopped to be politically relevant.

 

Then we come to the final episode in which the states first acceded to India, then merged among themselves to become viable groups and the final merger with the provinces by extinguishing royal houses in 1956. Viceroy Mountbatten’s support to Indian unification by keeping a tight leash on recalcitrant rulers is mentioned in this book. He applied a subtle, gentlemanly but relentless pressure on the states. In a hastily convened summit of the Chamber on Jul 25, 1947, he promised them that they need only to cede control on three subjects – defence, communication and foreign policy – to the new national government. Anyway, they had already ceded these three subjects to the British as the paramount power. Mountbatten then forced their hand by asking them to take a quick decision as the offer might not last. His political advisor, Conrad Corfield, opposed this direct intervention but was asked to accept early retirement. Copland then notes with obvious regret that the promises extended by both British and Indian leaders to the princes were not honoured. In place of their kingdoms, all merging rulers were given handsome tax-free pensions, free lifetime medical care for self and family, free electricity, exemption from customs duty, the right to go about with armed escort, a state funeral with military honours and qualified immunity from civil prosecution. Some rulers were incorporated into the new machinery as Rajpramukh (governor) but even this was taken away in 1956.

 

The book contains a number of amusing anecdotes of princely indulgences in the first few chapters. Such extravagance was, of course, borne by the taxpayers. The book is easily readable and the style and structure is very appealing. The only drawback is that footnotes are given at the bottom of each page which sometimes grows to the middle of the page. This affects readability. This work is very rare in the genre of Indian independence in that it presents an arena that is not visited by regular historians.

 

This book is highly recommended.

 

Rating: 4 Star