Shopping for Bombs

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Title: Shopping for Bombs – Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q.Khan Network

Author: Gordon Corera

Publisher: Foundation Books 2006 (First)

ISBN: 1-85065-826-9

Pages: 251

Corera is a Security Correspondent for BBC News since 2004. He covers counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and international security issues. His voluminous knowledge on those issues are abundantly evident in the subject matter of the book. It illustrates how a little known scientist from Pakistan managed to steal nuclear secrets from the company he worked for in Europe, used it to develop the Bomb for his home country and then actively peddled his secrets around the world for the highest bidder. The author has maintained justice to his subject, Khan and put before the world his true colours. It has also demonstrated in vivid detail how much the unsuspecting world has to fear for the future, as a result of rampant proliferation put in place by rogue states like Pakistan and outright rogue actors like A Q Khan. The imperfect practices and methodology of the non-proliferation regime. Corera has described how the West has been blinded by its own superiority complex as to curtail the monitoring of nuclear deals to technology transfer from the developed to developing countries and not among the latter nations.

Abdul Qadeer Khan was born in Bhopal, India and migrated to Pakistan in 1952. The vengeful Khan carried an undying anger against India across the border. He had his university education in the Netherlands and Belgium, after which he managed to obtain a job as metallurgist in FDO, a subsidiary of Urenco, an European consortium for nuclear technology. The enrichment facility provided Khan with blueprints, old parts and knowhow about the suppliers of critical technology like uranium enrichment centrifuges, who were also happily reluctant to ask any difficult questions if the price was right. 1971 came and Pakistan embarked on a disastrous war with India at the end of which the country lay dismembered with an added humiliation of the surrender of nearly 100,000 troops along with their supreme commander. Close on the heels of the victory, India conducted a nuclear test in May 1974 which sent the Pakistanis helter-skelter in search of national security. Khan returned home in 1975 to help then Prime Minister Bhutto to procure an Islamic bomb for which he was ready even to eat grass! Libya and Saudi Arabia extended financial support to Pakistan in the quest for a nuclear bomb to be shared as the legacy of Islam. Khan founded a research facility in Kahuta, which was later renamed as Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and began processing of uranium based on the stolen designs from Urenco. China’s support was evident during the early stages.

Natural uranium consists of U238 which is useless as such, having only 0.7% U235 which is the fissile material. Concentration of U235 is called enrichment, using ultra-high speed centrifuges to separate the isotopes which weigh different by a minute quantity. U235 at the level of 5% is suitable for power generation while the purity is required to be at least 90% for weapons. There is also a plutonium route in which plutonium is separated from spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors.

In Dec 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, paving the way for a new stage in US-Pak collaboration. Money and weapons poured to Pakistan to arm the Mujahideens fighting the Soviets. U.S. turned a blind eye to Pak’s own nuclear program so as not to upset the camaraderie. Pakistan, under the theologizing dictator-General Zia Ul Haq developed the bomb. However the relations with U.S. soured after 1988, after Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. Sanctions were imposed on Pakistan. During the 1990s, after perfecting the bomb design, Khan began to sell his wares to various customers around the globe – North Korea, Libya and Iran among them.

India performed nuclear tests again in 1998 under a Hindu nationalist government. This put immense pressure on Pak to test their own devices. Economic sanctions from the West threatened them, but Saudi Arabia promised a huge amount as compensation and also pledged 50,000 barrels of oil per day for free! Enmity between Pakistan’s bureaucracy also came out in the open, as the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was assigned the task of actual testing, snubbing Khan’s KRL. Its chief boasted, “We invited Dr. A Q Khan to the Chagai test site to show him what a nuclear test explosion look like”. Building a nuclear weapon is worthless, if the delivery mechanism is not developed. Khan obtained designs of North Korea’s nuclear-capable Nodong missile and rechristened it Ghauri, a medieval plunderer of India’s wealth.

Khan reported only to the top most leader, whether in government or the military and remained autonomous in his work. He sold enrichment technology and weapon designs to Iran and Libya for money – for himself as well as for the state. The deal with North Korea was a barter, with Korean missile technology assimilated by Pak, while it received nuclear knowhow. Corera analyses Khan’s motivations behind the naked proliferation he conducted. Greed was definitely the most important factor, which was also peppered with visions of global Muslim brotherhood and a dislike for the West, even though he had had a European wife and owed his education to the West, bringing out the ungrateful character of the man. Pakistani society hailed him as the Father of the Bomb, made him a national hero, perhaps even greater in stature than the nation’s founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Khan was supremely arrogant and flamboyant. He was above the law. He built a palatial house on the shores of Rawal lake in Rawalpindi amd spewed untreated sewage to the lake from which public water supply was taken. When municipal authorities tried to stop him by sending a bulldozer to remove the unlawful structure, his armed guards shot dead its driver. There were no actions against Khan.

Ironically, Khan’s star began to fade after 1998 nuclear tests. The Pakistan regime, in its new status as a nuclear weapon state had to act responsibly for which Khan was a hindrance, with his rampant proliferation and little regard to international law. The Nuclear Command Authority put up by Pervez Musharraf for the control of weapons made Khan redundant – he was made an advisor to the chief executive of the state. Allegations appeared in local press about Khan’s involvement in a swindling affair involving US$ 8 million. The ISI investigated the charges and found them to be true. The CIA and MI6 latched on to Khan network in the 2000s. The tipping point came when they intercepted a German vessel carrying nuclear enrichment material produced by Khan network in Malaysia to Libya in 2003. Gaddafi was afraid of his own skin, after Saddam was ousted by American intervention that same year. He made a clean breast of his country’s nuclear ambitions, disclosed details of his suppliers and renounced the nuclear path in return for re-engagement with the West. The collected data was so huge for Pakistan to ignore. Khan was forced to make a humiliating self confession on national television. He was also removed from all official positions and held under house arrest. The network also broke down under the pressure of international investigation.

The book brings out the motive behind poor, undeveloped countries going after nuclear technology. The most important element is the perceived status which comes along. This is helped in no small measure by the utterances of none other than Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister in 1958, when he said that Britain had nuclear weapons because, “it put us where we ought to be, in the position of a great power”. The disincentive is really not much, as the non-proliferation regime is toothless. The book is easy to read and conveys the ideas unambiguously. Extensive journalistic research is evident in the way events and details are handled.

The book, unfortunately lacks a sense of authority. Whatever the author has written is forcefully, but slightly unconvincingly. Some events like Libya are blown up to unnecessary detail.

The book is recommended.

Rating: 3 Star