From Hydaspes to Kargil

Title: From Hydaspes to Kargil – A History of Warfare in India from 326 BC to AD 1999

Author: Kaushik Roy

Publisher:  Manohar Publishers, 2004 (First)

ISBN: 81-7304-543-7

Pages: 241

Military history is one subject having very few takers and is always marginalized by mainstream historians. The power and authority of a state depends on the efficiency of its army. This book is an attempt to review the military strategies, formations and warfare over the two millennia from the battle with Alexander on the banks of river Hydaspes (Jhelum) in 326 BCE to the battle with Pakistan on Kargil in 1999 CE. Kaushik Roy is a fellow at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. He has published numerous articles in various journals and his book reviews appear regularly in The Telegraph. He is also a passionate collector of books on military history.

Ancient Indian army constituted the four-fold divisions of infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants, called chaturanga bala. These wings were never very coordinated in the battlefront. Alexander’s phalanx could cut through them with ease, beating Porus. However, the world conqueror was sufficiently impressed by the mighty elephants of whom his cavalry were mortally afraid. Alexander imported the elephants to his battle formations and its repercussions could be seen in Punic wars between Carthage and Rome. Hannibal, the mighty Carthaginian general marched African elephants against the Romans. The chaturanga bala declined in efficacy on the face of highly maneuverable mounted cavalry archers of the steppe nomads, like Parthians, Sakas and Huns. By 600 CE, the traditional army shrunk to three-fold, eliminating chariots.

Invention of metallic stirrup around 700 CE resulted in greater stability for the mounted archers, who proved to be no match for the indisciplined Indian infantry. As the local rulers relied excessively on the samantha system, in which each warlord was supposed to supply soldiers to the soverign in times of need. These were mainly marginal farmers who had no previous military training and who fought for booty and loyal to their own chieftains. Also, the concept of chivalry and the laughable kshatra dharma of the Rajput clans caused them to fall like ripe plums before invading Turkish Muslims. The Turks established sultanates in Delhi and adopted Indian systems in warfare, like elephants. The gradual indigenisation denied them the advantages of gunpowder and cannon. When this was coupled with the stoppage of the flow of Central Asian horses by Mongols, the days of the sultanate were numbered. They fell before Babur in 1526, at the First Battle of Panipat when Ibrahim Lodi lost to the Mughal before noon.

Babur introduced a novel concept of warfare he borrowed from Ottomans, the field artillery. The gunners performed well by scaring away elephants and stunned sultanate infantry by their booming guns. Ibrahim Lodi, the Delhi sultan himself was killed in the battle. Mughals consolidated their power across the subcontinent in the next 150 years, but the slow indigenisation of technology and introduction of mansabdari system eroded their battle-worthiness. The mansabdars, who were given surplus land revenue maintained a military strength which were many times more than the contingent directly commanded by the emperor. Light cavalry forces like Marathas and the tecnologically superior Persians sounded the death knell of Mughals after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707. Nadir Shah crushed them to powder in 1739.

By the 18^th century, military strategy again went a transformation. Elephants and cavalry archers faded away and infantry with light firearms and field artillery manned or trained by European gunners took its place. Strategically located forts also couldn’t provide asylum as heavy guns tore through them. The English East India Company (EIC) used Indian manpower to conquer all of the subcontinent. Their ordnance factories produced ammunition using Indian raw materials like salt petre. The company imposed its monopoly in purchasing salt petre. Connected to these developments was the fact that EIC was bankrolled by rich Gujarati merchants. We must marvel the ease and slothfulness with which we allowed a foreigner to fasten the noose of slavery tightly around our necks for the next two centuries! We allowed our motherland to be subjugated under the yoke of imperialism meekly.

The First War of Independence of 1857 finds due mention in the book. The munitions, man power, tactics and formations of the rebels and their white opponents are described in an analytical way, bringing out excellent comparisons and providing speculations about what went wrong for the rebels. Roy states that instead of merely practicing what they were taught in the military schools of East India Company, the sepoys should have adopted guerrilla hit-and-run warfare and should have destroyed the telegraph lines which provided a vital means of communication for the British. The importance of telegraph in British victory is amply expressed in the last cry of a sepoy condemned to the gallows. Pointing to the telegraph cable, he was said to have remarked, “It is that accursed string that strangled us”!

From 1857, the author takes a quantum leap to 1999, bypassing the two Pakistan wars and the Chinese war. Kargil conflict is analysed threadbare and the inadequacies of Indian military and its tactics are explained clearly. Contrary to popular belief, Roy argues that what was evident in Kargil was the ineffectiveness of Indian armed forces. Even with heavy artillery, assisted by aerial bombardment, India couldn’t evict the semi-regulars from their mountain hideouts. We had to let them go back safely, in order to end the war! India needs to take lessons from this episode.

Kaushik Roy ends the book with a consideration on why military coups do not take place in India, while it is a more than usual occurrence in Pakistan, even though both armies share the legacy of the British sepoy army. Indian army is said to have imbued with non-militaristic Hindu tradition where the fighting Kshatriyas always enjoyed only the second turn against the priestly Brahmins. Subservience to civilian authority is implicit in such a scheme. Indian army is quite diversified in its ethnicity, contrary to Pakistan, where the lion’s share comprises of people from a few districts of West Punjab. India also provide military employment to Gurkhas, who are Nepali citizens, but who constitute 10% of the Indian army! Also, Indian army does not enjoy the pride of place in its society as enjoyed by their counterparts in Pakistan where they are revered. To prevent occurrences of coups, the author suggests to transform the army as an occupational one, instead of institutional as at present. More manpower turnover in the form of short service commissions is a sure guarantee to keep the soldiers in their allotted spot in national polity.

The book is neatly written in a systematic way, with lots of reference material. In fact, Roy provides enough material for an enthusiast to do further research and come out with a book of the same size on any of the chapters contained in this work. The author’s sharp insight into the psychology of rebels and loyal sepoys during the First War of Independence deserves appreciation. The rebels almost fully consisted of upper caste Hindus, who refused to serve shoulder to shoulder with their lower caste brethren. That’s one of the reasons the backward castes supported the British regime and fought hard to eliminate the ancient regime which stifled their materialistic and spiritual growth.

The text could’ve been made more lively with more examples to prove the author’s point. In many places, it fails to arouse readers’ interest and falls to the level of a school text book on history. Perhaps in future editions of the work, the author may care to consider this specific point to enliven the narrative.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 3 Star