Why India Needs the Presidential System

Title: Why India Needs the Presidential System

Author: Bhanu Dhamija

Publisher: HarperCollins, 2015 (First)

ISBN: 9789351363460

Pages: 373

In one sentence, ‘forceful but not convincing’.

Coalition governments are a nightmare in any democracy, and more so in India where money plays undue influence on the political decision-making. After Rajiv Gandhi’s administration was voted out of power in 1989 and before Narendra Modi sworn in as prime minister in 2014, the quarter century had been a harrowing time for probity and integrity in the public sphere. Since no party could rule on its own, the partners extracted their pound of flesh in the form of concessions and kickbacks. Corruption skyrocketed during the tenure of Manmohan Singh, who had absolutely no popular backing and was selected for the top post only because of his unflinching loyalty to the party bosses. This sad plight of the country evoked responses from scholars and numerous ways were envisaged to make the executive safer from venal legislators, while at the same time keeping it accountable to the people. Bhanu Dhamija proposes the American presidential system in this book as the panacea for all ills facing India at present. The author is a political commentator who is the founder and chairman of the Divya Himachal group, the largest newspaper publishing company in Himachal Pradesh. He has spent long years in the US, where he had founded a media company that published trade journals.

The analysis outlined in the book is heavily tilted towards the American system. The author’s contention is that the three features of a political system, namely political fairness, a national agenda and participatory democracy are not available in India. We had copied the British system as a whole, which is said to be deceptively attractive. There, monarchy was a crucial non-partisan institution in which all powers were reposed. The British system needed a small homogeneous nation with no religious controversy to prosper. Besides, it was fit only for a unitary state and not for a federation like India, as argued by Dhamija. Some comments are very novel, like ‘government is behind every evil in society and every virtue’.

The book laments the dominating role played by the Congress party in the Constituent Assembly and that of Nehru in the Congress and concludes that the Assembly was unduly influenced by this pressure group. Congress controlled 208 out of the 324 seats. Discussions were held in party forums and decisions taken. The members were then issued whip asking to vote along the party line. This eliminated the chance of a free and fair deliberation taking place on the floor of the House. Dhamija even alleges that the Drafting committee of the Assembly was ‘asked only to dress the baby’. He has harsher words about the role played by Nehru, that he ‘believed that he knew what was best for the nation. As such, he felt that his views deserved to reign supreme. He was attracted to the parliamentary system because it offered all the trappings of aggrandizement. It provided the wherewithal for one man to prevail’ (p.15).

Parliamentary system is alleged to have paved the way for the partition of India when coupled with Congress’ reluctance to share power with the opposition. In the 1937 elections to the provinces, Congress won seven out of the eleven states and the Muslim League was summarily defeated, winning nowhere. Jinnah hoped that the Congress would share power with his party in a spirit of accommodation and conciliation. But this didn’t materialize. Of course, the Congress was not under any legal obligation to share power. However, this denial stoked fears of living forever under majority rule in a large section of Muslims. Calls for a separate Islamic state came up in 1940. Dhamija argues that parliamentary system is inherently riddled with the domination of the ruling party, while the aspirations of the minority can be more honourably accommodated in the presidential system. In India, the legislative control of the executive is absent as the government controls the legislature on account of the ruling party’s numerical supremacy in the parliament. Party bosses reign supreme in such a scenario, as seen in the extra-constitutional influence of political dynasties. In the presidential system, the candidates are selected by party primaries. Here, Dhamija forgets that in the Indian context, party bosses can still control the outcome of the primaries.

The book contains comparison of the political systems of India, the UK and the US, with extensive quotes of the speeches in the constituent assemblies. Such fine details of the American system put the readers off a little. On the Indian constitution-making experience, the author has some stunning tales to tell. The constitution developed out of the first draft by B N Rau, the advisor of Nehru. He had sent a questionnaire to the Assembly members soliciting their views on the essential features of the new constitution. He got only one response from the members and hence prepared a draft himself. In a joint meeting of the Union committee headed by Nehru and Provinces committee chaired by Patel, the consensus reached was to go for the presidential system. However, the Union committee mysteriously ignored the suggestion. Similarly, the Provinces committee had decided to employ direct election to choose state governors on the insistence of Patel, but when the Drafting committee introduced it in the Assembly, this was changed in favour of appointment by the Centre. Patel was not present in the Assembly at that time, while Nehru rose to claim that this change was with Patel’s consent. The Centre always viewed strong provinces with suspicion and Nehru’s arguments about an elected governor were, a) elected governor would, to some extent, encourage separatist tendency, b) might be some kind of rival to the government of the province and c) enormous elections would be required to select the governor.

The book compares the bad features of the Indian system with the good ones of the American presidential scheme. There, the outlook of the two major political parties – especially on economic, societal and foreign affairs – are essentially the same. The American society is much more homogeneous than Indian, by melding themselves in the great American Melting-pot. But in India, each caste, community or sect jealously preserves its own customs and characteristics. Speeches in the Constituent Assembly opposing the parliamentary system do seem to be unduly praised in the book. The author forcefully drives home the point that autocracy or oligarchy is much more feasible in the parliamentary system, even though most Indians – many of them very learned – think otherwise. Non-separation of the legislature and executive is the cause of this. Nehru went for a strong government at the centre, but is said to have forgotten that the strength of a nation comes not from a forceful government, but from a willing people. Dhamija describes many grueling episodes from the Emergency era to show how Indira Gandhi usurped all powers to keep within her household.

The author expresses unrestrained enthusiasm for the presidential system. The book is written under the presumption that ‘India’s political system is completely broken’ (p.150), which is definitely not the case. Mitigating features of our country is not taken into consideration. Even though parliamentary system means that one party can run the show singlehandedly, even a cursory glance at the past shows that minorities and sectarian interests are duly accommodated. Examples are cherry picked to bolster the author’s arguments. Dhamija argues that the prime minister’s powers to appoint judges is an intrusion into the freedom of judiciary in India, but praises the American president’s privilege to nominate judges as ‘it is to give expression to people’s wishes in the judiciary’. Indirect election of the Indian prime minister is much derided, but the election of the US president is touted as the supreme example of expression of the people’s free will. This is not exactly so. The American president is elected through an electoral college, and the citizens’ privilege is limited to select a member to this college. How can this be called ‘direct’? More than two prominent candidates have the potential to wreak havoc in that system as well. India’s anti-defection law is vilified as a scheme that subverts free debates and voting in the House. However, when we consider the pathetic state of the legislature that was prevailing until that law came into force, in which there was rampant cross-voting by accepting bribes, one can hardly share the author’s viewpoint. The book is provided with a good bibliography and a nice index to look up the text.

The book is highly recommended.

Rating: 4 Star