Title: Why I Killed the Mahatma – Uncovering Godse’s Defence
Author: Koenraad Elst
Publisher: Rupa Publications, 2018 (First)
ISBN: 9788129149978
Pages: 251
India's independence from British rule in 1947 was hard won, but was marked with heavy bloodshed in the partitioned provinces. Though Partition was accepted and approved by Indian leaders as a necessary evil, they were perplexed by the rivers of blood that flowed across its eastern and western borders. The atmosphere was highly charged that forced political leaders little leeway other than toeing the official line in their dealings with the other nation. Gandhi, rightly or wrongly, stuck to his principle of truth and demanded that it be extended to the sphere of international negotiations. This led India to compromise on its earlier stand of declining to pay Pakistan's allotted share of foreign exchange reserves as Pakistan had invaded Kashmir in the meanwhile. Such acts drove ultranationalists into a mortal hostility to Gandhi. On Jan 30, 1948, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, the editor of a Pune-based Marathi daily, assassinated him by firing his gun at close range. He was immediately apprehended and sentenced to death after trial. Godse chose not to plea for clemency and commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment. A lengthy justification was given by him to the court as part of the proceedings. India under Nehru always chose to keep Godse’s testimony hidden by banning its publication. With the passage of time, the regime’s ardour weakened and many reproductions started appearing in the public domain. This book is a very good work that examines his defence in court and clearly explains the rationale behind India’s most notorious political assassination. Koenraad Elst is a Dutch author who has a strong affinity to Indian culture and society. A few observers even accuse him of having links with rightist movements in the country.
The first part of the book analyses the superficial changes that took root in India at the behest of western-minded elite that closely associated themselves with India’s first Prime Minister, Nehru. The government-sponsored scholars refused to analyse the political rationale behind Gandhi’s murder. This lent unsustainable credence to the idea that his assassin was motivated by religious fanaticism and little else besides. On the other hand, the author finds Godse to be a secular nationalist opposed to religious obscurantism and caste privileges existing in Hindu society. The book includes an introduction by Gautam Sen that lacerates the false pretensions of the ‘liberal’ intelligentsia that drew its strength and sustenance from government funds. The post-independent Indian historical writing is dominated by a monolithic political project of progressivism that eventually lost sight of verifiable basic truths. Dominated by leftists, this genre soon descended into crass, self-serving political activism and censored dissenting views that challenged their institutional privileges and intellectual exclusivity. They successfully imputed mythical status to an alleged threat of Hindu extremism and its complicity in assassinating Gandhi.
Elst lists out the accusations made against Gandhi in some detail and reconciles Godse’s past with the credibility of his allegations. In the early stages of his career in social work, Godse was attracted by Gandhian ideals. Soon he got disillusioned with Gandhian double standards on the face of Muslim extremism. He pandered to their most outrageous demands without a whimper of protest while chastising the Hindus for even the slightest infraction. Godse then took a leadership role in the initiatives to cure Hindu society of casteism and untouchability by organizing inter-caste meals and other symbolic offences to the untouchability taboo. The proximate cause for the murder was the foreign exchange issue. Pakistan demanded Rs. 550 million as its rightful share after Partition. Nehru declined to disburse this amount as Pakistani soldiers were stationed inside Kashmir at that time in their failed bid to wrest the province from India. Gandhi put pressure on the government to pay this amount, even threatening it with a fast unto death. Nehru relented and paid the money which Pakistan used to procure more arms to fight the Indian army in Kashmir. This was the first time in history that a country deliberately financed its battlefield opponent!
This book provides an incisive view into the irrational theory of Gandhi’s nonviolence. Godse also cites this as political justification for his crime. Justice does not figure in Gandhi’s calculus of nonviolence. People should innocently die by way of moral gesture, rather than inflict a just punishment on the aggressor. He advised the refugees who flew for their lives from Pakistan to go back and face their assailants with open arms. If the miscreants wanted to kill them, Gandhi asked to offer their neck to the sword without resistance! Courage is required even for such a thing as suicide. At the same time, Gandhi chose to ignore his advice when the time came for him to follow it. Gandhi always declared that the country would be partitioned only over his dead body. But when the partition plan was put through, he decided not to embark on any fast unto death against the Muslim League since he very well knew that death surely awaited at the end of the fast. Gandhi’s ideas always contained a misplaced kind of personal asceticism eclipsing any socially responsible concern for public justice. Gandhian nonviolence was at best only a technique of applying moral pressure by a weaker party on the stronger, but Gandhi turned it into an article of masochistic surrender to aggression. The applicability of this doctrine was pathetically limited as evidenced by its incapacity to influence the partition crisis.
Irrespective of the political viewpoint, there is near unanimous consensus among observers that Gandhi encouraged Muslim separatism and never took a line opposing them in public. Elst gives a long discussion on this aspect. In India, the Muslim leadership had a historic memory of empire and felt entitled to its restoration after the British left. The only dispute within the Muslim elite was whether they should aim for a gradual re-conquest of the whole of India or to settle for a partition and be secure in the control of a large part of the country. The Muslim League wanted immediate separation while the conservative ulema believed in eventual takeover of the entire country on a future date and remained in the Congress as ‘nationalist Muslims’! Gandhi supported the fanatic Khilafat movement, but suddenly withdrew citing violence at Chauri Chaura. The withdrawal was received as betrayal and led to the biggest wave of communal violence since the establishment of British paramountcy. Khilafat sought to reestablish the fallen Turkish sultan as the leader of all Muslims in the world and as such, was intrinsically anti-nationalist, which united Indian Muslims with their counterparts in other nations against all infidels. Even after the debacle, Gandhi refused to do any serious introspection about its intellectual failure and simply continued peddling cheap observations about Islam as the religion of brotherhood. In this process, he built up medieval obscurantists like Ali Brothers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who later became the nation’s education minister in Nehru’s cabinet. The most shocking incident is Gandhi’s support for inviting Amir Amanulla of Afghanistan to invade India to relieve Muslims of infidel rule. When the Amir showed his reluctance, Maulana Azad convinced the Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan and flee India which had turned into a dar ul-harb (abode of enmity). Thousands heeded his call, sold everything and migrated. But they found the Afghan society hostile and inhospitable, so they returned back to India under great hardship.
The author makes a careful study of the aftermath of Gandhi assassination and its impact on the fortunes of the Hindutva forces. Even at a distance of several decades, people invoking Gandhi’s name still evade the hard questions raised by Godse in his courtroom speech. However, Elst concludes that the killing was a strategic mistake. Godse hurt his own movement far more than any enemy forces ever did. Just before his death Gandhi was a discarded leader, a proven failure hated by many millions of Hindus. The Hindu movement was riding a wave of popular support after Congress had failed in its electoral promises of 1945. Overnight, the tide completely turned against the Hindutva forces and Gandhi was resurrected as a saint and martyr whose failures were strictly a taboo as a topic of discussion. Whatever be the merit of his actions, the concluding paragraph in Godse’s speech exhibit his fervent hope that his actions would be recognized by the nation in the end. He says, “My confidence about the moral side of my action has not been shaken even by the criticism levelled against it on all sides. I have no doubt honest writers of history will weigh my act and find the true value thereof on some day in future” (p.133).
A notable feature of this book is that no holy cow of post-independent India escapes its severe criticism. For Elst, Gandhi is just a political leader as any other. It leaves no stone unturned in nailing Nehruvian secularism for superficiality, flimsiness and conceit. He remarks that the superficiality of thought in Nehruvian secularism is compensated for by thoroughness in dishonesty (p.26). Godse’s comments in his testimony are also critically evaluated and inconsistencies pointed out. By making the speech public in his own way, Elst contributes to the citizens’ right to freedom of speech and expression, as the publication of the speech is still banned in India. The book is pleasantly readable and provides a much-needed alternative perspective of the tumultuous events unleashed by Partition.
The first part of the book analyses the superficial changes that took root in India at the behest of western-minded elite that closely associated themselves with India’s first Prime Minister, Nehru. The government-sponsored scholars refused to analyse the political rationale behind Gandhi’s murder. This lent unsustainable credence to the idea that his assassin was motivated by religious fanaticism and little else besides. On the other hand, the author finds Godse to be a secular nationalist opposed to religious obscurantism and caste privileges existing in Hindu society. The book includes an introduction by Gautam Sen that lacerates the false pretensions of the ‘liberal’ intelligentsia that drew its strength and sustenance from government funds. The post-independent Indian historical writing is dominated by a monolithic political project of progressivism that eventually lost sight of verifiable basic truths. Dominated by leftists, this genre soon descended into crass, self-serving political activism and censored dissenting views that challenged their institutional privileges and intellectual exclusivity. They successfully imputed mythical status to an alleged threat of Hindu extremism and its complicity in assassinating Gandhi.
Elst lists out the accusations made against Gandhi in some detail and reconciles Godse’s past with the credibility of his allegations. In the early stages of his career in social work, Godse was attracted by Gandhian ideals. Soon he got disillusioned with Gandhian double standards on the face of Muslim extremism. He pandered to their most outrageous demands without a whimper of protest while chastising the Hindus for even the slightest infraction. Godse then took a leadership role in the initiatives to cure Hindu society of casteism and untouchability by organizing inter-caste meals and other symbolic offences to the untouchability taboo. The proximate cause for the murder was the foreign exchange issue. Pakistan demanded Rs. 550 million as its rightful share after Partition. Nehru declined to disburse this amount as Pakistani soldiers were stationed inside Kashmir at that time in their failed bid to wrest the province from India. Gandhi put pressure on the government to pay this amount, even threatening it with a fast unto death. Nehru relented and paid the money which Pakistan used to procure more arms to fight the Indian army in Kashmir. This was the first time in history that a country deliberately financed its battlefield opponent!
This book provides an incisive view into the irrational theory of Gandhi’s nonviolence. Godse also cites this as political justification for his crime. Justice does not figure in Gandhi’s calculus of nonviolence. People should innocently die by way of moral gesture, rather than inflict a just punishment on the aggressor. He advised the refugees who flew for their lives from Pakistan to go back and face their assailants with open arms. If the miscreants wanted to kill them, Gandhi asked to offer their neck to the sword without resistance! Courage is required even for such a thing as suicide. At the same time, Gandhi chose to ignore his advice when the time came for him to follow it. Gandhi always declared that the country would be partitioned only over his dead body. But when the partition plan was put through, he decided not to embark on any fast unto death against the Muslim League since he very well knew that death surely awaited at the end of the fast. Gandhi’s ideas always contained a misplaced kind of personal asceticism eclipsing any socially responsible concern for public justice. Gandhian nonviolence was at best only a technique of applying moral pressure by a weaker party on the stronger, but Gandhi turned it into an article of masochistic surrender to aggression. The applicability of this doctrine was pathetically limited as evidenced by its incapacity to influence the partition crisis.
Irrespective of the political viewpoint, there is near unanimous consensus among observers that Gandhi encouraged Muslim separatism and never took a line opposing them in public. Elst gives a long discussion on this aspect. In India, the Muslim leadership had a historic memory of empire and felt entitled to its restoration after the British left. The only dispute within the Muslim elite was whether they should aim for a gradual re-conquest of the whole of India or to settle for a partition and be secure in the control of a large part of the country. The Muslim League wanted immediate separation while the conservative ulema believed in eventual takeover of the entire country on a future date and remained in the Congress as ‘nationalist Muslims’! Gandhi supported the fanatic Khilafat movement, but suddenly withdrew citing violence at Chauri Chaura. The withdrawal was received as betrayal and led to the biggest wave of communal violence since the establishment of British paramountcy. Khilafat sought to reestablish the fallen Turkish sultan as the leader of all Muslims in the world and as such, was intrinsically anti-nationalist, which united Indian Muslims with their counterparts in other nations against all infidels. Even after the debacle, Gandhi refused to do any serious introspection about its intellectual failure and simply continued peddling cheap observations about Islam as the religion of brotherhood. In this process, he built up medieval obscurantists like Ali Brothers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who later became the nation’s education minister in Nehru’s cabinet. The most shocking incident is Gandhi’s support for inviting Amir Amanulla of Afghanistan to invade India to relieve Muslims of infidel rule. When the Amir showed his reluctance, Maulana Azad convinced the Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan and flee India which had turned into a dar ul-harb (abode of enmity). Thousands heeded his call, sold everything and migrated. But they found the Afghan society hostile and inhospitable, so they returned back to India under great hardship.
The author makes a careful study of the aftermath of Gandhi assassination and its impact on the fortunes of the Hindutva forces. Even at a distance of several decades, people invoking Gandhi’s name still evade the hard questions raised by Godse in his courtroom speech. However, Elst concludes that the killing was a strategic mistake. Godse hurt his own movement far more than any enemy forces ever did. Just before his death Gandhi was a discarded leader, a proven failure hated by many millions of Hindus. The Hindu movement was riding a wave of popular support after Congress had failed in its electoral promises of 1945. Overnight, the tide completely turned against the Hindutva forces and Gandhi was resurrected as a saint and martyr whose failures were strictly a taboo as a topic of discussion. Whatever be the merit of his actions, the concluding paragraph in Godse’s speech exhibit his fervent hope that his actions would be recognized by the nation in the end. He says, “My confidence about the moral side of my action has not been shaken even by the criticism levelled against it on all sides. I have no doubt honest writers of history will weigh my act and find the true value thereof on some day in future” (p.133).
A notable feature of this book is that no holy cow of post-independent India escapes its severe criticism. For Elst, Gandhi is just a political leader as any other. It leaves no stone unturned in nailing Nehruvian secularism for superficiality, flimsiness and conceit. He remarks that the superficiality of thought in Nehruvian secularism is compensated for by thoroughness in dishonesty (p.26). Godse’s comments in his testimony are also critically evaluated and inconsistencies pointed out. By making the speech public in his own way, Elst contributes to the citizens’ right to freedom of speech and expression, as the publication of the speech is still banned in India. The book is pleasantly readable and provides a much-needed alternative perspective of the tumultuous events unleashed by Partition.
The book is highly recommended.
Rating: 4 Star
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